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ABSTRACT
Secondary markets have not historically possessed the characteristics necessary 
for market power to emerge, or effective product differentiation to be implemented.  The 
potential effects of these characteristics on primary – secondary market interaction is 
generally not considered.  The law of one price is expected to hold in secondary markets. 
By applying the hedonic technique to producer theory, and integrating the durability of 
the product directly into the profit maximizing conditions, potential differences in 
implicit prices between customer segments in the used bucket truck market are 
estimated.
Applying weighted least squares to the hedonic equation, parameters were 
estimated to indicate whether differences in hedonic prices exist between customer 
segments in the secondary, utility construction equipment market.  The hedonic 
approach accounted for differences in price due to physical characteristics, while 
underlying supply and demand conditions were accounted for using indicator variables 
for time.  Estimated differences in the effects of physical characteristics on price, 
between industries, were identified using interaction terms.  Results of the econometric 
estimation indicate that differences in physical product characteristics do not fully 
account for differences in price between customer segments in the secondary bucket 
truck market.
   If the law of one price can be violated in a secondary market, this could 
indicate market power.  Future research on primary – secondary market interaction 
should consider the potential effects, if such market power does indeed exist.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Secondary (used) durable goods markets have been frequently studied based on 
their potential effects on market power and price discrimination in the primary market 
(e.g. Coase 1972; Anderson and Ginsburgh 1994; Kumar 2002; and Esteban and Shum 
2007).  As if only through their impact on the primary market do they play any 
significant role in determining economic outcomes.  In the past, this assumption is not 
surprising.  Twenty years ago, researchers would find it difficult to identify any 
semblance of market concentration or product differentiation in a typical used, durable 
goods market.  The used automobile market, perhaps the most widely studied and 
organized used durable goods market, historically existed as tens of thousands of small, 
independent dealerships, scattered throughout every town, city, and rural outpost in the 
United States.  Used car dealerships served their local markets with little, if any, 
expectation of product differentiation between dealers.  Search costs associated with 
venturing outside the local market were assumed high, and rightfully so (Anderson and 
Ginsburgh 1994).  Barriers to entry were low, requiring little relative capital or technical 
expertise when compared to new car dealers.
While many attributes of used durable markets, including the used car market, 
still exist today, the internet seems to have begun to change the market landscape.  Sites 
such as www.eBay.com, www.AutoTrader.com and www.CommercialTruckTrader.com 
bring together the availability of thousands of used vehicles from every corner of the 
country.  Consumers are no longer confined to limiting their search costs by staying 
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local, as they can quickly search a nationwide/worldwide inventory of used cars and 
other durables (Diekmann et al 2008).  Hosting a website and charging a fee to bring 
together many sellers, who each name their own price, does not constitute market 
concentration or power in the used car market itself, it is simply a case of potential 
market power in the internet space, i.e. Perhaps www.AutoTrader.com can charge higher 
fees than competitive websites.  However, the internet has logically lessened the 
differential search costs between new and used markets (Clemons et al 2002).  While 
this could potentially shift some buyers, depending on preferences, away from the new 
market and into the used, it says nothing about gaining market power within the used 
market itself.  This may require something that is potentially lacking in the used car 
market, product differentiation between sellers (Corts 1998).
If one, or a few, sellers of a used durable good could distinguish their product 
from competing products in the marketplace, then perhaps they could charge a premium 
price, even perhaps capture consumer surplus where differentials in price do not 
necessarily match differences in marginal cost (Corts 1998).  This could be challenging, 
as one would expect, for example that producing a higher quality, used product may 
necessarily require higher input costs.  If producing a truly, higher quality, differentiated 
product required a relatively high degree of technical expertise and capital investment, 
then while marginal costs are expected to increase, so to are potential barriers to entry.
Let us imagine a used durable goods dealer who purchases product from sources 
in various geographic regions throughout the country, as not to limit the availability of 
raw materials.  The dealer then pays to transport the used durables back to a central 
repair facility, in which well-trained technicians are required to completely refurbish the 
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product.  Let us further assume that the consistent level of quality produced is 
significantly higher than other dealers in the industry.  Imagine that the average unit 
purchased by the dealer has a considerable acquisition cost, well above the cost of an 
average used car.  Assume that each unit purchased is relatively large, weighing between 
10,000 and 40,000 pounds, so that the land and repair facility required by the dealer is 
significant.  Assume that the product serves a specific, business to business, niche, so 
that the expertise and human capital cost required to purchase, transport, repair, and sell 
the product is relatively high.  Lastly, assume that the firm has a high cost, but 
dominating marketing presence in the industry, such that it is capable of product 
differentiation in the marketplace.  If these assumptions are true, then we might expect 
that significant barriers to entry and product differentiation exist, which are both 
traditionally associated with the potential ability to exert market power (Borenstein 
1985).
If it is also possible that heterogeneous customer groups, with differing demand 
elasticities are easily identified, and that arbitrage is unlikely, then perhaps a supplier has 
the ability to charge different prices depending on the individual market (Pigou 1932).  If 
serving different market segments requires unique physical characteristics of the product 
for each market, then the market(s) is actually made up of “different” products, not 
differentiated ones.
If the niche industry described above was an integral part of a more basic 
industry that affects every consumer's daily life, then perhaps it is worth economic study. 
Not only could it be important from a consumer welfare perspective, but it may be 
important from the perspective of the application of economic theory.  Theories of 
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market power and primary – secondary market interaction, do not typically account for 
product differentiation between sellers in the secondary market.  If ongoing research in 
these areas continues to focus only on potential market power in the primary market, 
then that is understandable.  The current project lends itself to those endeavors, because 
if market power and product differentiation exist in secondary markets, then there is 
likely to be some effect on the primary market.  Conventional theorists may desire to 
take this potential effect into account, and adjust the assumptions used to relate 
secondary markets to primary ones.  This project does not attempt to put forth a new 
addition to theory, but only seeks to empirically identify whether such a secondary 
market exists.  To this end, we look at the utility industry.
The utility industry in the United States, including electric power, land-line 
telecommunications, cellular communications, and fiber optic communications, requires 
continual infrastructure buildup and maintenance.  The electric utility infrastructure in 
the U.S. and the rest of the industrialized world was built between 60 and 80 years ago. 
Much of this infrastructure is outdated, and with the continuing increase in demand for 
power each year, the grid cannot safely and reliably manage the loads of today and 
tomorrow without significant upgrades.  It is estimated that $41 billion will be invested 
globally in the electrical transmission and distribution infrastructure through 2015 
(Fisher 2010).  By 2030, the electric utility industry will need to make a total 
infrastructure investment of $1.5 to $2.0 trillion (Chupka et al 2008).
In addition to scheduled infrastructure upgrades, existing infrastructure such as 
land-line telecommunications and electric utility lines, can be partially destroyed on an 
annual basis due to extreme weather and other natural disasters (earthquakes on the west 
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coast, hurricanes in southeastern and gulf states, tornadoes and ice storms in the plains, 
and blizzards in the north).
Construction and maintenance of utility infrastructure requires the use of a 
specialized type of equipment known as a bucket truck.  Bucket trucks consist of a 
hydraulic lifting system known as an aerial device, which is mounted onto a truck. 
Aerial devices can also be mounted onto other types of vehicles such as vans or tracked 
carriers.  Bucket trucks are designed to lift personnel into the air to perform work.  Some 
bucket trucks are also equipped with a material handling winch at the boom tip that is 
designed to lift materials and supplies.
Utility construction equipment, such as bucket trucks, serves the critical needs of 
the electric utility and telecommunications industries.  Industry segments that purchase 
bucket trucks include:  investor owned utilities, telecommunications companies, power 
cooperatives and municipal power agencies, as well as electric utility and 
telecommunications contractors specializing in the construction and maintenance of 
transmission and distribution power lines and telecommunications infrastructure.    The 
estimated annual value of U.S. utility construction equipment sales is $1.5 billion 
(Edington 2012).  Each of the customer segments above require specific attributes to be 
present in the equipment they purchase.  For example, the electric utility transmission 
segment will typically buy insulated bucket trucks with a minimum working height of 70 
feet.  The electric utility distribution segment buys insulated bucket trucks with lower 
working heights.  The telecommunications segment typically purchases non-insulated 
bucket trucks with working heights of 43 feet or less.  Although some bucket truck 
buyers operate in more than one segment, due to the specifications needed by each 
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segment, equipment cannot practically be transferred from one segment's fleet to another 
(Edington 2012).
Four U.S. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) produce 98% of the utility 
construction equipment sold in North America. Altec produces an estimated 65%, Terex 
adds an additional 20%, while ETI and Versalift produce the remaining 13% (Edington 
2012).  Unlike the automobile industry, bucket truck manufacturers do not have a 
comprehensive dealer network.  New bucket trucks are not manufactured in mass, and 
then shipped to dealer sales lots; dealer lots do not exist.  Bucket trucks are typically 
ordered, per specification, directly from the OEM.
OEM equipment is sold/leased/rented to many large utility entities and 
municipalities. Large utility organizations use their own personnel and their new(er) 
utility equipment fleets for standard, daily maintenance of infrastructure.  However, the 
actual construction/rebuilding of utility infrastructure is done by contractors, many of 
whom buy used utility construction equipment.  Estimated annual U.S. sales of used 
utility construction equipment is $200 million (Edington 2012).
Like the market for new utility construction equipment, the used market is also 
dominated by a relatively small number of firms who serve the end-user.  Seven used 
equipment sources account for 80% of used utility construction equipment sales to end-
users across North America.  These seven firms tend to have nationwide and/or global 
customer bases.  Three of these large suppliers are either wholly or partially 
owned/controlled by an OEM.  The other four have close business relationships with 
other OEMs.  The remaining 20% of used utility construction equipment sales are made 
by hundreds of small dealers that tend to serve more localized markets (Edington 2012).
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In the used market there is a high degree of variation in the quality of the product 
being sold.  Many sellers acquire the used equipment, transport it back to their location, 
and sell it “as-is where-is” to end-users without performing any type of service to the 
vehicle.  At the other end of the spectrum is Utility Fleet Sales, which is one of the seven 
large suppliers.  Utility Fleet Sales completely inspects, services, and reconditions all 
major components, and sells a product that is guaranteed to work.  Most firms, serving 
the end-user, offer a product that is somewhere in between, and is at least cleaned and 
partially serviced.  Due to the high level of variation in product quality, and intensive 
marketing efforts by firms offering a higher quality product, a level of product 
differentiation is believed to exist.  This is evidenced by the fact that Utility Fleet Sales 
continues to gain market share, although its prices tend to be as high as other firms.  It is 
estimated that Utility Fleet Sales has a current U.S. market share of 15%, but is expected 
to have a 45% market share by 2020.  The completely reconditioned, ready-to-work, 
remanufactured utility construction equipment offered by Utility Fleet Sales is quickly 
becoming the industry standard among end-users (Edington 2012).
Note that the industry data and information sources cited in the previous pages 
are estimates made by industry experts.  The reason that more scientific conclusions and 
hard data do not currently exist may be due to the fact that the utility construction 
equipment industry has only existed, in its current state, for approximately a decade, and 
the largest participating firms in the industry are privately held, so published data does 
not exist.
Prior to the early 2000's, Altec and the other utility construction equipment 
OEMs sold product outright to end-users.  True leases were rare.  End-users, who bought 
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new equipment, would continue to utilize the equipment purchased until it had no useful 
life remaining.  End-users who could not economically justify purchasing new 
equipment would rent equipment.  Rental companies would continue to keep units in 
their rental fleets until the units had no useful life remaining.  Equipment would be sold 
at auction for scrap metal and spare parts (Edington 2012).
In the late 90's, Altec moved to an equipment leasing/rental business model, and 
other OEMs quickly followed suit.  Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) and Waldman (2003) 
examine the role of leasing in durable goods markets.  They demonstrate the economic 
advantages that exist when firms with market power rent/lease new equipment as 
opposed to outright selling.  In our context, Altec's move toward almost always 
renting/leasing equipment to the retail market demonstrates that firm's potential 
recognition of the increased profitability that the theorists suggest.
In the years that followed, Altec began buying other OEMs and immediately 
ceased production of the purchased product lines.  Hence, creating a higher level of 
market concentration and power.  These acquisitions left only Altec, Terex, ETI, and 
Versalift as the dominant suppliers in the market (Edington 2012).
Since 2005, the structure of the market for used utility construction equipment 
has continued to change rapidly, based on economic opportunities.  Savvy individuals 
had the foresight to recognize the glut of higher quality, five to six year old, used 
equipment that would exist annually due to the industry's change to the leasing/rental 
model.  They also recognized the lack of a dealer network in place to deal with the resale 
of off-lease equipment.
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Only over the past eight years have companies such as NUECO, JJ Kane, and 
Utility Fleet Sales begun to flourish.  These firms have rapidly created a viable market, 
and a profitable distribution infrastructure to sell late-model, off-lease utility 
construction equipment to end-users.  Distribution channels and intra-industry alliances 
continue to change and form as this thesis is being written.  Simply put, the used utility 
construction equipment industry is brand new.  Through aggressive marketing strategies 
and comprehensive industry knowledge, firms such as Utility Fleet Sales have helped 
end-users recognize the availability and the economic benefits associated with 
purchasing this late-model, off-lease equipment, thus actually creating demand 
(Edington 2012).
Due to the relative youth of the industry and the fact that the primary 
participating firms are privately held, published data and analysis do not currently exist. 
This is unfortunate, considering the importance of utility construction equipment in 
ensuring that our global utility infrastructure remains reliable and up-to-date.
The secondary utility construction equipment market appears to fit the 
description that was described above:  One in which relatively few dominant suppliers 
exist, and product differentiation may be present.  It is an essential part of an industry 
that provides the utilities that every consumer relies upon.  Customers should self-select 
the specific type of equipment they purchase based on equipment attributes that match 
the type of work they perform.  Further, the market does not appear to possess the 
characteristics of a highly contestable market.  Barriers to entry, or at least barriers to 
scale appear likely.  A relatively high level of specialized industry expertise, training, 
and human capital are required to effectively purchase, transport, recondition, and sell 
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the product.  Raw materials (used equipment and parts) are relatively expensive. 
Significant scale requires significant investment in land, buildings, shop equipment, and 
other inputs.  At least one large competitor appears to be producing a truly differentiated, 
higher quality product.  Operational efficiency and marketing dominance appear to be 
present, and coupled with product differentiation, could, theoretically, be leading to 
significant price differences between market segments, even after differences in product 
characteristics are controlled for.
Economic Problem
Is there evidence of price differences between customer segments in the 
secondary utility construction equipment market, which are not due to differences in 
physical product characteristics?
Hypothesis
Differences in price between customer segments are primarily due to differences 
in physical product characteristics, but these characteristics do not fully account for 
differences in price.
Objectives
 1. Identify the most suitable theoretical framework for the problem at hand.
 2. Determine the appropriate empirical model for estimation.
 3. Determine the most appropriate statistical technique to estimate parameters.
 4. Validate the model both statistically and for applied accuracy.
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 5. Conduct appropriate statistical tests to reach a conclusion about the research 
hypothesis.
Significance of the Study
Economists have for decades, and continue to put forth theoretical work on how 
the existence of secondary markets impacts primary (new) markets.  The primary focus 
of the work has been on how the secondary market impacts the durable goods 
monopolist's and/or oligopolist's ability to exercise market power in the primary market. 
The justification for many market power studies is related to consumer welfare 
outcomes, which is certainly meaningful.  Oligopolistic settings, or product 
differentiation, leading to monopolistic competition, are typically studied as a primary 
market phenomenon.  What seems to be missing in past studies of primary – secondary 
market interaction is any recognition of potential market power or product differentiation 
in the secondary market, which should, theoretically, impact the primary market and thus 
have an impact on consumer welfare.  This is somewhat understandable, because in the 
past there has been little evidence to suggest that any secondary market represented a 
suitable environment for market power or product differentiation to exist.
In true, traditional, scientific fashion, something potentially different has been 
witnessed in the marketplace (nature) that perhaps warrants further explanation; the 
recent development of a secondary market in which it appears that a relatively high 
degree of market power and product differentiation could exist.  Furthermore, the market 
witnessed is crucial to the everyday, common existence of each and every individual 
living in developed and developing countries world-wide, because it is crucial in 
providing the electric utility and communications infrastructure that people rely upon.
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If the current study shows that differences in used bucket truck prices cannot be 
fully accounted for by differences in physical product characteristics, then perhaps future 
research on primary – secondary market interaction should attempt to account for 
potential market power and/or product differentiation in secondary markets.  At the very 
least, future researchers may more easily identify real-world environments in which such 
a phenomenon might exist.  If the current study finds no evidence that “the law of one 
price” has been violated, in such a seemingly “inviting environment”, then it has at least 
given further scientific justification to past and future research for continuing to ignore 
the possibility in secondary markets.
Outline of the Study
Chapter two reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature.  Chapter 
three develops the specific methods used to accomplish said objectives.  The specific 
data applied to the methods are presented in Chapter four.  Chapter five provides a 
detailed description of the results for the methods employed, and a formal test of the 
research hypothesis.  The thesis concludes with a summary, along with conclusions that 
can be drawn from the research results, and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The purposes of this chapter are:  1) to present the concepts that tie together; 
price differences, product differentiation, market power, secondary markets, hedonic 
pricing, and utility construction equipment, 2) to review the economic theory and 
empirical techniques that pertain to this research, and 3) to outline the justification for 
the chosen method.
Market Power, Product Differentiation, and Differences in Price
It was Arthur Pigou (1932) who introduced the concept and taxonomy of the 
discriminating monopoly, and put forth the conditions under which the law of one price 
could be, and was, violated.  While Pigou's original definitions and taxonomies used to 
describe the economic principle(s) underlying price differences have been challenged 
and/or expanded upon by authors such as Robinson (1933), Machlup (1955), and Coase 
(1972), his basic principles still underlie the concepts studied today.
Pigou's basis for the existence of price discrimination is founded in the idea of a 
potential market with only one, monopolistic, firm.  He recognized that even in a 
monopolistic environment, price discrimination would not be possible unless certain, 
underlying conditions were met.  The critical condition being that no one unit of a good 
could take the place of any other unit.  Hence, no one unit sold in one market could be 
transferred to another, and no one unit of demand could be transferred to another market. 
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Thus, the idea of the “no arbitrage” condition for effective price discrimination was put 
forth.
Pigou also described three degrees of discriminating power.  The first degree 
involves charging a different price for each unit sold (bought).  The firm extracts from 
each purchaser their maximum willingness to pay for each and every unit traded.  A case 
of what is typically called “perfect” price discrimination, in which all the consumer 
surplus, associated with a perfectly competitive market, is transferred to the firm.  Pigou 
explains that this first degree is highly unlikely to ever exist, because it involves 
complete market segmentation in which every consumer's willingness to pay must 
somehow be uncovered.  Second degree discrimination exists when a firm charges n
different prices, and is typically associated with volume discounts, i.e. large volume 
buyers pay less for each unit.  Pigou finds it highly unlikely that even second degree 
discrimination can exist in the long-run, because it eventually leads to arbitrage.
Pigou's contention was that, in real life only third degree price discrimination is 
actually found.  Third degree discrimination exists when the seller can segment the 
market into n different customer groups, based on relevant differentiating 
characteristics.  Assuming that the no arbitrage condition can be enforced by some 
mechanism.  It is evident that most economists share Pigou's contention, to some degree, 
as the overwhelming volume of price discrimination literature has primarily focused on 
third degree discrimination only.  Pigou, like Robinson (1933) was primarily concerned 
with welfare economics, and how non-competitive markets affected optimal, societal 
outcomes.
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Joan Robinson (1933) introduced the concept of monopsony, and its price 
discriminating effects on the labor force.  Unlike Pigou, who more generally introduces 
the idea that differing demand elasticities is what makes third degree price 
discrimination possible, Robinson concentrates on and details how differing elasticities 
are the root cause for discriminating behavior.  Price discrimination occurs when a 
monopsonist will buy from each source of supply in a way that allows for the marginal 
cost to equal the total marginal utility of the whole amount purchased.  The advantage 
for a monopsonist comes from the differences in the elasticities of supply from various 
sources.  According to the author's theory, once lured into monopsonistic systems, the 
supply of labor increases over time, and cannot respond appropriately to declines in 
wages.  She claims that this lack of responsiveness, inelasticity, leads to overall lower 
wages and higher unemployment.  It is Robinson's thorough treatment of identifying 
differing elasticities as a means of price discrimination, which has continued to permeate 
the price discrimination literature through today.  Third degree price discrimination can 
only exist with a downward sloping demand curve, in which there would exist consumer 
surplus in a competitive environment.  With no economic surplus, there would not exist 
anything for the monopolist  or monopsonist to gain in a less competitive setting.
Following Pigou (1932) and Robinson (1933), literature on price discrimination 
began to make its way into different fields of economics and was applied to various 
issues; rate-making problems in Transportation and Public Utilities; antitrust problems in 
Industrial Organization; unfair competition issues in Marketing; dumping in 
International Trade; basing-point and delivered price problems in Government Control 
of Business; and problems of output determination in Pure Economic Theory (Machlup 
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1955).  In 1955, Fritz Machlup attempted to bring some of the separate studies together 
into a more comprehensive framework, and tie in the concept of product differentiation.
Machlup's paper focused on the taxonomy, descriptions, and functional 
definitions associated with different forms and purposes of price discrimination.  The 
first thing he attempted was a more comprehensive definition of price discrimination in 
general:  “The practice of a firm or group of firms selling or leasing at prices 
disproportionate to the marginal costs of the products sold or leased, or of buying or 
hiring at prices disproportionate to the marginal productivities of the factors bought or 
hired” (Machlup 1955).  Machlup's definition does not include any reference to 
homogeneous products, indeed this is explicitly purposeful in his paper.  He points out 
that products need not be homogeneous and in fact certain types of price discrimination 
rely heavily on differentiated products.  Machlup also reminds us, as do his 
predecessors, that at least some degree of market power is what makes price 
discrimination possible.  Machlup then classifies different types of price discrimination 
based on its purpose and based on the technique used.  Here we focus only on those 
classifications most relevant to the work at hand.
He distinguishes between three main classes of technique:  Personal, Group, and 
Product.  While he acknowledges that the classes are not mutually exclusive, his 
discussion winds together different classes in a way that require some unwinding here, to 
be useful in the current setting.  Under the classification of Personal or Individual price 
discrimination, he takes great care and gives clear examples of what seem to be more 
precisely categorized as product discrimination.  He points to discrimination based on 
the type of work the product is put to and the degree of quality that a product possesses. 
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He then discusses product use again under the Group discrimination heading.  Product 
use and quality are most certainly a function of the specific attributes contained in the 
product.  Machlup defines Product discrimination as a setting in which customers choose 
freely among different products and/or product qualities at different prices.  Again, a 
setting which depends on the individual product characteristics.  This is but one 
example, where Machlup's work seems to create a “jigsaw puzzle” of pieces that are not 
easily arranged into a clear picture of price discrimination (Papandreou 1955). Machlup's 
discussion helps to make three points that are important to the current endeavor:  First, it 
is difficult to unwind the concepts of price discrimination and product differentiation, in 
any setting in which product differentiation is present.  This is a point that Coase seems 
to make in his evaluation of Machlup's work.  In Coase's words, “A more serious 
objection to my argument might be that, if accepted, it would result in the problem of 
price discrimination being swallowed up in the general monopoly pricing problem.  This 
is so.  And I approve of it” (Coase 1955).
Secondly, Machlup believed, at the time, that his “get the most out of each 
group” classification (a technique that he lists under the Group Discrimination heading) 
was something rarely seen in manufactured products.  He points to four reasons:  1) 
Discrimination in industrial pricing is almost always under suspicion of being unlawful. 
2) It is difficult to divide the market into distinct user groups.  3) It is difficult to 
discover, because of so many differences in production costs.  4) Having a high degree 
of market power is not easily achieved in manufacturing.  However, if we take 
Machlup's classifications as partially arbitrary, and more descriptive than functional, 
which he himself admits, then we can re-class the manufacturing scenario into one of 
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product discrimination and/or differentiation, and fairly easily dispose of three of the 
four reasons given above.
First, while discrimination that is intended to hamper competition is generally 
considered unlawful, product differentiation, and thus differential pricing, is not.  This 
makes unlawful price discrimination more difficult to identify in the presence of product 
differentiation.  Secondly, in a setting of product differentiation for specific uses, it is not 
difficult to divide the market into distinct groups of users.  In fact, as Machlup points 
out, users will self select.  Machlup's fourth reason, that a high degree of market power is 
not easily obtained in manufacturing, is easily disposed of today regardless of how the 
discrimination is classified.  In fact, most of the price discrimination literature, since 
1955, as well as the general market power literature, has focused around durable goods. 
Machlup seems to have overlooked the potential high barriers to entry in many 
manufacturing settings.  Although, in Machlup's defense, it could be that Machlup's 
intent has either been misunderstood or misconstrued.  As far as Machlup's third reason 
above; using a product discrimination setting at least points to identifying a product's 
objective characteristics, which may allow insights, not on absolute production costs, but 
at least on the expected direction of production cost differentials.  A point which was 
eluded to by Coase in his comments to Machlup's paper, “...dealing with a multiproduct 
firm, it would appear to be an undue simplification not to take into account explicitly 
that the costs of and the demands for the various products will often be interrelated” 
(Coase 1955).  The third point that can be gleaned from Machlup's work, which is 
critical to the current project, is the need to identify, quantify, and value a specific 
product's observable characteristics.
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Borenstein (1985) showed analytically that even in highly competitive markets, 
price discrimination could exist when there is product heterogeneity, and that free-entry 
alone does not necessarily hinder discriminatory pricing.  As examples, he points to 
industries such as magazine subscriptions and hotel rates.  Reduced subscription rates for 
students or “kids stay free” promotions in hotels are certainly cases in which sales prices 
are different although marginal costs are not.  Borenstein claims that it is the 
heterogeneity between brands that makes this possible.  He uses a spatial model of 
monopolistic competition to show that sorting customers based on brand preference can 
be a stronger sorting mechanism than differences between basic product characteristics. 
According to Borenstein, sorting based on strength of brand preference is not present in 
earlier models of price discrimination. His work stresses a concept that has been 
accepted in the literature since.  Brand constitutes a form of product differentiation for 
certain purchasers, just as other measurable characteristics do.
However, Borenstein's model assumes that products differ in only one 
dimension, brand, and therefore he can, and does, assume that marginal costs are equal 
between brands.  When applying Borenstein's work to empirical cases, this becomes a 
“slippery slope,” because differentiated products may vary in many dimensions, 
including differences in physical characteristics, which may likely mean differences in 
marginal costs.  In an empirical setting, the researcher must account for differences in 
price, which are due to differences in physical characteristics, otherwise the effect of 
brand, while potentially important, may be overstated.
Borenstein's model also allows for the possibility that a consumer does not 
purchase the product at all.  This is a fair possibility in consumer markets for non-
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necessity items such as hotels or magazine subscriptions.  However, in markets for 
goods that are necessities, and in which no reasonable substitute exists, the possibility of 
not purchasing quickly diminishes.  As is the case of the current endeavor.  This research 
deals with a market for a product, bucket trucks, that is a required business asset for 
completing certain projects.  Unless the purchaser forgoes a particular revenue stream or 
goes out of business entirely, if his/her company needs a bucket truck, then they will 
purchase or lease one.  As long as the marginal cost of owning (leasing) is no greater 
than the marginal revenue received from putting the asset to work, then some purchasing 
(leasing) transaction should take place.  It is perhaps fair to assume that there is a portion 
of bucket truck demand (within a certain price range) that is perfectly inelastic.  An 
assumption that is far from the case of a purely competitive scenario.
Anderson and De Palma (1988) mathematically (not empirically) show the 
importance of accounting for interaction effects between cross-sections that potentially 
account for price differences, and measurable product characteristics.  Their model is 
developed in a spatial (geographic) context, but also accounts for the heterogeneity of 
products based on characteristics.  Their work is included here, because their 
mathematical model shows that interaction effects between location and product 
characteristics should be considered.  They recognize that consumers in different 
geographic locations may exhibit differences in marginal willingness to pay for certain 
product characteristics.  They showed that minimum differentiation occurs in geographic 
space when there is a high degree of heterogeneity in characteristic space.  When there is 
little differentiation in characteristic space, the market solution involves a high degree of 
dispersion in the spatial dimension.  While this research does not account for a 
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geographic dimension, it accounts for other non-continuous cross-sections that may 
interact with product characteristic variables.  Anderson and De Palma's work remind us 
that parallelism between cross-sections should not necessarily be assumed.  Interaction 
effects should be tested for.
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) develop a theory of how the existence of 
secondary (used) markets may effect how a monopolist implements price discrimination. 
They show that a monopolist can extract maximum rents in the presence of a secondary 
market by controlling the quality of their product such that it is either “worthless” in the 
secondary market or is “as good as new” in the secondary market.  Unlike previous 
research, they indicate that if the secondary market is competitive then the monopolist 
does not necessarily have an incentive to kill-off the secondary market, because the 
monopolist essentially uses the secondary market as a sorting mechanism (consumers 
self-select), by which to achieve a form of indirect price discrimination.
Previous research had distinguished two effects that secondary markets have on 
monopolists:  1) Secondary markets increase the willingness to pay for new products, 
because the purchaser has a viable market in which to dispose of the product later.  2) 
Secondary markets decrease the price that monopolists can charge for new products, 
because their own used product is competing with the new product.  Anderson and 
Ginsburgh essentially attempt to untangle these two opposing influences.  They also 
point out that previous models of secondary markets have concentrated on either the 
“lemon problem” (asymmetric information), or optimal durability of the monopolist's 
product.  They cite various papers in which the lemon problem need not hold.
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Anderson and Ginsburgh also make two assumptions that are relevant to discuss 
in the context of the current research.  First, they introduce the assumption that 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences and therefore differing valuations of new and 
used products.  Secondly, they assume (as is typically assumed) that only buyers in 
secondary markets incur transaction costs.  The current endeavor attempts to partially 
strengthen their first assumption, one of heterogeneous buyers in the used market, but 
completely dismisses their second assumption in the current market context.
In the bucket truck market, sales are business to business transactions, in which 
income producing assets are being purchased.  There are clear, observable, different 
markets into which used bucket trucks are sold.  Bucket trucks with certain observable 
characteristics are sold into each market.  For example, electric utility contractors 
exclusively purchase insulated bucket trucks, while telecommunications contractors 
purchase non-insulated units.  While heterogeneity of preferences between new and used 
products is the essence of the Anderson and Ginsburgh assumption, the current project is 
concerned primarily with the secondary market.  The idea of heterogeneous preferences 
for certain product characteristics within the used market is focused upon.
Anderson and Ginsburgh assume that only secondary market purchasers incur 
transaction costs.  In the traditional context of durable goods markets, which existed 
twenty-five years ago, this assumption may be reasonable.  For example, purchasing a 
new car involved going to the dealership(s) of choice and deciding which car to 
purchase, or simply picking up the phone and ordering the exact car desired.  Purchasing 
a used automobile involved scouring numerous, small used car dealers, or classified 
advertisements, until the consumer may/may not have found the brand, style, and quality 
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of choice.  Gathering information about used car options required a significant 
investment of time.  Imagine attempting to purchase other types of used durables; 
refrigerators or furniture, before the world-wide web was readily available.
The assumption of only having transaction costs in the secondary market is not 
valid in the current research.  First, today the internet is alive and well.  In the context of 
the automobile example, a purchaser can search sites such as www.AutoTrader.com, sort 
available products based on numerous characteristics, and instantly search a nationwide 
market.  Utility construction equipment options available on the internet are vast.  The 
industry uses sophisticated websites with various search criteria options, full sets of 
photographs, and video for each item (e.g., www.UtilityFleetSales.com). Additionally, 
aggregation sites such as www.CommercialTruckTrader.com, list available bucket 
trucks from many dealerships around the country.  The internet has seemingly driven 
down the search costs associated with used durables, however in the bucket truck 
market, specifically, there is a potentially more significant reason that the Anderson and 
Ginsburgh assumption cannot be made; production time.
Unlike new, consumer automobiles, new bucket trucks are not produced by the 
tens of thousands and shipped to a plethora of dealers to sit on sales lots.  New bucket 
trucks are typically ordered to specification from the manufacturer, and then must be 
produced.  As of the time of this writing, a new bucket truck could take from six to 
twelve months to receive, once the order is placed and a deposit is made, depending on 
the specifications of the unit (Fumasi 2013).  This can create a significant cost to the 
purchaser in the form of lost revenue, while they must wait for the unit.  This can be 
mitigated by proper management of the purchasing cycle, however this management is 
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not without cost.  Additionally, contractors (who constitute a large portion of used 
bucket truck purchasers) typically bid for contracts.  If the contract is awarded to them, 
they must typically expand their fleet rapidly.  They are not likely to have a considerable 
excess bucket truck capacity, which sits idle until the next contract becomes available. 
This reality makes perfect management of the purchasing cycle very unlikely.
The concept of production times for manufactured-to-order products creates a 
unique opportunity and secondary market, which has vastly different characteristics than 
traditional, consumer durable markets studied.  If the secondary market can offer buyers 
a close substitute for new, without the wait time, and at a lower acquisition cost, then the 
traditional assumption that manufacturers of durable goods are competing with 
themselves in future periods becomes more powerful than ever.  If secondary dealers can 
also significantly lower a buyers' search costs by using the internet, then the secondary 
market may indeed exhibit lower overall “search” costs than the new market.  As is the 
case with www.AutoTrader.com in the consumer auto market, this phenomenon 
becomes a more realistic possibility as the used bucket truck market becomes more 
centralized and/or large, preferred suppliers emerge.
In 1989, Thomas Holmes published a paper that was closely related to the 
Borenstein (1985) work.  Like Borenstein, Holmes distinguishes between a buyer's 
choice not to buy at all, from that based on the tendency to buy from a different supplier. 
The primary difference is that Borenstein relied on simulations, while Holmes employed 
analytical methods.  Holmes shows that the price elasticity of demand that a firm faces 
in the market can be expressed as the sum of two parts:  the overall industry-demand 
elasticity and the cross-price elasticity between competing suppliers.  The paper is 
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included in this review to again point out the common type of market that has been 
assumed in past research; an assumption that does not generally hold in the current 
context.  Like Borenstein (1985), Holmes assumes the market is one for a non-necessity 
good, for which the consumer may choose to not buy at all.  As discussed above, this is 
not a valid assumption in the utility construction market.  Contractors bid on contracts. 
Once the contract is awarded, they will typically need to add trucks to their fleet to 
complete the contract on time and on budget.  Not buying, and thus not fulfilling the 
contract, is not typically a viable business option.
Stavins (1996) empirically finds that price differences in the airline market 
become more common as the market becomes more competitive.  Stavins empirically 
tests the theoretical findings of Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), that price 
discrimination may increase with less market concentration.
Stavins uses a reduced-form, hedonic regression model for parameter estimation. 
Her model takes into account measurable airline ticket characteristics.  She also uses 
interaction terms to allow price discrimination to vary with market concentration (she 
uses a Herfindahl index to measure concentration).  However, because a group of her 
primary independent variables (ticket restrictions) were highly correlated, she included 
only one of the ticket restrictions at a time in her estimation.  It is possible that this 
procedure may have resulted in biased parameter estimates.  While the use of a hedonic 
model, with interaction terms, is an appropriate method for the problem at hand, 
dropping theoretically important variables from the estimating equation to minimize 
collinearity issues will be avoided.
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Corts (1998) theoretically shows that it is possible for third-degree price 
discrimination in an oligopoly setting to actually lead to lower prices for all consumers. 
This is because the price discrimination can actually lead to all out price competition, 
which makes firms worse-off, so firms avoid using price discriminating tactics.  Corts 
uses game theory to demonstrate the conditions under which different types of equilibria 
can be reached.  For effective price discrimination to be carried out there must be some 
existent asymmetry in which different firms rank different consumers as their “strong,” 
primary market.  In this case price discrimination can be a symmetric best-response for 
the firms.  Product differentiation makes this possible, because then it becomes more 
likely that each firm will have a different “strong” market.  Corts' primary objective is to 
demonstrate that price symmetry is not necessarily the same thing as best-response 
symmetry, but that price symmetry is a necessary condition for effective, common price 
discrimination.  However, a uniform price equilibrium can be reached when a firm 
makes a credible commitment not to discriminate.
Corts admits that conditions on demand that generate the various regimes he 
displays remain elusive.  He explains that a more complete characterization of demand 
conditions that generate the results is needed and would further our understanding. 
Perhaps the idea of a uniform price condition is best illustrated by the project at hand, 
because it is a business to business setting in which purchases are made on more 
objective criteria than consumer markets, i.e. profit maximization.  Additionally, it is 
possible that a secondary market has much closer to a continuous range of product 
quality offered by each firm.  For example, a purchaser can select a unit from a broad 
spectrum of different mileage characteristics, but the units are otherwise the same.  Corts 
26
points out that if each firm has such a diverse product offering, based on perceived 
product quality, then no price discrimination is necessary.  One could argue that a well-
stocked used dealer has a much more diverse product offering than a new dealer, with 
numerous brands and a much larger variation in product quality and pricing.
Kumar (2002) examines the optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy 
for a durable goods monopolist in the presence of a secondary market.  Like Anderson 
and Ginsburgh, Kumar finds that a durable goods monopolist can benefit by the 
existence of a secondary market.  This occurs when the durable goods monopolist 
properly controls the quality of its product, so that the profit maximizing obsolescence 
path is reached.  However, what is also relevant to the current problem, is that Kumar 
finds that the resale trading frequency and the price discount for used products depends 
on the strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.  
Bucket trucks are designed to lift personnel into the air, sometimes reaching 
heights of over 120 feet.  Hence, due to safety, the construction of the aerial device is 
such that the primary structural components of the unit are “overbuilt.”  That is to say 
that the primary steel and fiberglass components of the device are constructed so that 
they will typically far outlast the truck chassis itself.  Additionally, many of the most 
widely used aerial device technologies in new equipment have not significantly changed 
for decades (Edington 2012).  Other durable goods markets have a much more robust 
rate of technological obsolescence than does the bucket truck market.  This creates an 
opportunity for skilled and efficient operators, who have the expertise to cost-effectively 
refurbish the product.  If done thoroughly, and perhaps even remounting the aerial 
device onto a new chassis, the secondary product can effectively be “like new.”  Thus 
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the price discount for used product is minimized, and the resale trading frequency may 
likely increase, as the remanufactured product takes more customers from the primary 
market.
Recall that price discrimination is generally defined as price differences that 
cannot be fully explained by differences in costs.  Clerides (2004) focuses on the cost-
side of this definition.  He explains that the literature goes to great length to control for 
potential sources of cost variation, but still most studies conclude that price 
discrimination exists.  He argues that the possible reason for this is that some sources of 
cost variation are not being accounted for.  He points out that conventional acceptance 
that price variation, which cannot be explained by cost differences, constitutes price 
discrimination, has not been thoroughly formalized, especially in a setting of 
differentiated products.
Clerides explores the two common ways that researchers typically compare costs 
in the price discrimination research:  1) Price-cost margins (absolute differences) and 2) 
Price-cost markups (percentage differences).  Clerides uses empirical data and hedonic 
analysis to compare the two methods.  He finds that each method gives a very different 
result regarding rejecting the hypothesis of no price discrimination, when applied to the 
same set of data.
Liu and Serfes (2005) use a game-theoretic framework to show that price 
discrimination can lead to a Nash equilibrium in which a firm who produces a higher 
quality product can extract consumer surplus, while the lower quality firm is less 
profitable.  They explore the effect of how changing the cost of acquiring consumer 
information affects the equilibrium outcome.  Unlike Corts (1998), who assumes that 
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consumers can be segmented into two groups, Liu and Serfes assume that consumers can 
be segmented into more than two groups with different demand elasticities.  Liu and 
Serfes indicate that if the fixed cost of acquiring consumer information is below a certain 
threshold, then in the unique Nash equilibrium only the high quality firm acquires the 
information and price discriminates.  They further show that the high quality firm always 
benefits from acquiring information.  The low quality firm's best response is to credibly 
commit not to price discriminate.  The equilibrium profit of the high quality firm 
monotonically increases as the precision of the consumer information improves, within a 
range.  If the cost of acquiring more precise information becomes too high, then neither 
firm purchases the information.
While the Liu and Serfes results may not be entirely intuitive, the general 
explanation is as follows.  If the low quality firm acquires information and uses it to 
charge discriminatory prices, they price themselves out of the market in every period 
except the first.  If the initial, low quality prices are discriminatory, but still lower than 
the high quality firm's prices, the high quality firm meets those prices in the second 
period, and the lower quality firm still has zero demand for its product.  This illustrates 
the importance of true, product differentiation, in which one firm's product is actually of 
higher quality, and that quality is made known to buyers.  Once consumers recognize the 
quality difference in the first period, the low quality firm has no chance of exercising 
price discrimination.  Getting this result relies on the assumption that consumers have 
perfect information in the first, and subsequent periods.  Realistically, only once a 
consumer purchases each type of product and compares quality, will they have the 
information necessary for the Liu and Serfes outcome.  In the real world, this may take 
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time, which may allow the low quality firm to charge discriminating prices for more than 
one period.  They will do so as long as the benefit gained from new, first-time buyers in 
each period is greater than the loss associated with the customers from the previous 
periods who are lost.
In the current setting, the precision by which customers are segmented, and the 
cost of acquiring such information are both relatively low.  Based on the  Liu and Serfes 
outcome, it is expected that high quality firms may be acquiring the information. 
However, as described above, purchasers do not posses perfect information in the real 
world.  Hence, it is expected that lower quality bucket truck firms are also acquiring the 
information and may be exercising some level of price discrimination.  This outcome is 
expected to diminish over time, as more purchasers have the opportunity to distinguish 
between the differing levels of quality.  Thus, the long-run result should be consistent 
with the  Liu and Serfes outcome.  Regardless of the industry, the  Liu and Serfes result 
is plausible as a long-run equilibrium.
Household Production Theory and Hedonic Price Analysis
Machlup (1955) points out the need to account for a specific product's observable 
characteristics, when attempting to identify differences in price. The most widely used 
tool to accomplish this task in empirical studies is the hedonic technique.
According to Nerlove (1995), hedonic price analysis has its origins in 
Agricultural Economics with Frederick V. Waugh (1928).  Waugh's purpose was to 
determine consumers' relative valuations of certain characteristics of asparagus, and to 
estimate the buyer's marginal willingness to pay for each attribute.
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In 1961, Griliches recognized the failure of the major price indices to fully 
account for changes in product quality over time.  His goal was to estimate implicit 
(shadow) prices for certain quality changes in automobiles over time, and use those 
estimated shadow prices to correct the price indices.  His general reasoning is in his 
recognition that durable goods are sold in many varieties/models, and that the qualities 
those models possess over time is always changing.
Griliches uses a semi-log hedonic equation that regresses price on measurable 
values of automobile characteristics, some being continuous variables and some being 
indicator variables to account for either the presence, or lack thereof, of particular traits. 
He then introduces an indicator variable for specific time periods, which allows him to 
estimate the average change in the group over time.  Griliches then uses his regression 
results to adjust price indices for quality change.
Griliches recognized certain limitations in his work.  First, he applies list price 
data to his model, but recognizes that list prices may not accurately reflect transaction 
prices.  He also applies his model to used cars, however the range of data used is only 
for used cars between six months and one year of age.  For the current project, actual 
transaction prices on used equipment, spanning at least twenty years of age, are 
available.  However, perhaps most importantly to the current research, Griliches points 
out that measurable characteristics such as length and weight are only proxies for the 
things that consumers ultimately value, i.e. comfort.
The vast majority of the hedonic literature is based on consumer products, in 
which the consumer derives utility from the measured characteristics in the model. 
Often times authors are forced to use proxies.  For example, researchers can measure 
31
sugar content (brix) in fruit, but cannot objectively measure sweetness, which is likely 
the consumer's ultimate source of utility.  In using hedonic models for consumer 
products, economists have an additional limitation:  While they can estimate differences 
in willingness to pay, they cannot necessarily interpret the reasons for the absolute 
differences in magnitude.  As an example, research may indicate that a consumer is 
willing to pay, on average, $3,000 more for a black car than a white car, ceteris paribus. 
But why is the difference equal to $3,000 and not $5,000?  Research on automobiles 
commonly uses horsepower as an attribute in the hedonic model.  Research finds that 
consumers are willing to pay more for something that will cost them more later, due to 
increased fuel usage.  From a purely pecuniary perspective, how do economists justify 
this?  They don't.  Psychologists do.  The issue lies in the fact that hedonic equations for 
consumer products are only one step removed from utility, a concept that is ordinal, not 
cardinal.
The current endeavor deals not with consumer products, but with income 
producing, business inputs.  This has an advantage when interpreting “why” a specific 
attribute has a specific estimated shadow price.  For example, if a bucket truck buyer is 
willing to pay $5,000 more for a unit that possesses a material handling winch, ceteris 
paribus, then perhaps it can be assumed that the buyer expects to gain at least $5,000 
(not accounting for discounted value) in additional revenue over the life of the input. 
This is a more constructive interpretation than simply, “The buyer prefers a unit with a 
material handling winch, and is willing to pay $5,000 for it.”  The advantage here is 
based on the fact that productive inputs are two steps removed from utility.  The 
business operator will ultimately gain utility when he spends the additional profit gained 
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by use of the material handling winch, but the ultimate utility gained is not the focus 
here.
While the work of Waugh (1928) and Griliches (1961) demonstrates that hedonic 
modeling has been used in some form for many decades, current researchers sometimes 
credit the advent of household production theory with allowing for the development of 
the hedonic technique in its current state.  Hedonic models are founded in the analysis of 
quality differences and choices between goods that differ in observable characteristics. 
Household production theory and the empirical implications created by it, are the 
foundations by which hedonic models were developed (Deaton & Muellbauer 1980).
Becker (1965) recognized that any and all non-working uses of time had two 
important components of cost, the direct, market price of the activity and the foregone 
value of the time used up during the activity, the indirect cost.  Even sleeping typically 
possesses both components.  A consumer spends the market prices on things such as a 
bed and a pillow, but also gives up the income that could have been earned if the time 
was spent working.  Becker creates a general theoretical framework that enables 
researchers to treat the cost of time on the same footing as the cost of market goods.
Accomplishing this, required that Becker treat the household as a productive unit. 
As a producer, the household possesses a production function that allows it to combine 
market goods, i.e. beds and pillows, with time, to produce the final, utility producing 
commodity, sleep.  Becker applied the general theory to determining how changes in 
income, earnings, and market prices, may affect how consumers allocate their time 
between work and non-work activities.  The paper revealed that the traditional labor-
leisure model was far more specific and restrictive than it needed to be, thus impeding 
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broader empirical applications.  Becker also found that previous results explaining the 
income and substitution effects due to changes in income, earnings, and market prices, 
were perhaps misguided.  By accounting for the value of time in its entirety and treating 
the household as a productive unit, Becker's model opened the door for more accurately 
estimating how/why consumers change consumption habits and how/why they change 
their allocation of time between competing activities.  Becker's work was the beginning 
of a new theory of choice.
In similar fashion as Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966) put forth the idea that 
conventional consumer theory (at the time) was vastly inadequate.  Lancaster showed 
that the depth of results coming from consumer theory could be improved by 
recognizing that consumers do not gain utility from consuming a particular “good,” they 
instead get utility from the specific, intrinsic attributes that the good possesses.  He 
pointed out that “the objective nature of the goods-characteristics relationship plays a 
crucial role in the analysis and enables us to distinguish between objective and private 
reactions to such things as changes in relative prices.”  Lancaster included an 
explanation of how his model could effectively be used in durable goods markets by 
recognizing and using two types of dimensions in characteristic space; cross-section and 
time.
Household production theory was the framework used to explain consumer 
choice, given differing product characteristics.  It did so by treating households as 
producers of final, utility bearing characteristics.  Actual market goods were treated as 
inputs into this production process.  Rosen (1974) diverges from this by imposing a 
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market between buyers and sellers, where firms themselves tailor their goods to embody 
final characteristics desired by consumers.
Rosen (1974) clearly defined what is meant by hedonic prices.  A class of 
differentiated products is completely described by a vector of objectively measured 
characteristics.  Observed product prices and the specific amounts of characteristics 
associated with each good define a set of implicit or “hedonic” prices (Rosen 1974). 
Rosen's work took Lancaster's general theory of consumer behavior, and applied the use 
of hedonic prices in describing market equilibria.  While previous work had illustrated 
that hedonic price differences are equalizing only at the margin and could identify 
neither supply nor demand, Rosen introduced a feasible econometric procedure that 
could accomplish this task in some cases.  However, Rosen's work has still been faulted 
for not having the ability to distinguish between supply and demand, in a more general 
setting, thus giving rise to the “identification” problem.
 Prior to Rosen's work, the literature dealing with quality variation had 
emphasized consumer behavior.  Rosen's work was an attempt to identify properties of 
market equilibrium in a setting of quality variation.  Rosen's paper ignores the possibility 
of secondary markets, which is an assumption that is not adequate here.  However, 
Rosen does assume one thing that will be used; that each market good has a fixed, 
observable value of the characteristic vector.  In other words, there exists a well-defined 
mapping from market good space to characteristic space.  However, Rosen's model 
assumes that there are clearly defined quoted prices for identical bundles, and that 
consumers will purchase from the seller who offers the lowest price.  These assumptions 
do not hold very well in the current project, but may within a range of characteristics. 
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Product offerings are seldom “identical” in used goods markets.  Rosen's assumptions of 
zero arbitrage capabilities, and indivisibility are spot-on in the current context.  Bundles 
cannot be untied and sellers cannot economically repackage existing products.
Witte et al (1979) applied Rosen's theory of implicit markets for characteristics 
of goods to the housing market.  In an attempt to remedy the identification problem, they 
empirically estimate a joint envelope of a family of value functions and another family 
of offer functions, thus accounting for both demand-side and supply-side variables. 
Their multi-step procedure allowed them to solve for the price that made the quantity 
demanded and the quantity supplied of each characteristic equal, by treating the problem 
as if each characteristic has its own, separate market.  The primary assumption used to 
accomplish this is the assumption of separability.  Their results represent coefficients of 
an envelope function, which reflects both bids and offers.  They admit that their general 
price results for the composite good, housing, are not readily interpretable, but that the 
model gives meaningful implicit marginal prices for good attributes.  This could perhaps 
be the reason that their procedure has not been widely adopted in the empirical hedonic 
literature.  Most researchers regress price (or log price) on a set of product characteristic 
values (or log values), and assume that either the market is in equilibrium or that supply 
is exogenous.
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) offer a comprehensive look at consumer theory 
and demand estimation including the use of hedonic prices, which is based largely on the 
work of Rosen (1974) mentioned above.  Deaton and Muellbauer refer to the intrinsic 
attributes that a product possesses as “specification variables.”
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According to Deaton and Muellbauer, the approach given when dealing with 
different varieties of goods is to introduce quality parameters, and through them, 
specification variables, directly into the utility function.  The quality parameter for each 
good is assumed to be a function of the specification variables.  They describe setting up 
the empirical specification so the intercept gives the price of some reference variety in 
each time period and can serve as a measure of the general price level for all the varieties 
of a good.
Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985) sought to find the primary determinants of price 
differences in the European automobile market.  Their endeavor is perhaps more similar 
to the current work than any other work discussed here.  Their hypothesis was that if 
they could control for technical differences and product differentiation based on brand, 
then any additional differences in price between countries in which the auto was sold, 
would suggest market power.  They introduce the microeconomic framework leading to 
the econometric model, and then use a semi-log specification of a hedonic price equation 
to estimate parameters.  Their results indicate that consumer brand preference is 
significant in determining price, but that prices between countries still have significant 
differences even after brand and technical differences are accounted for.
The empirical methods used by Mertens and Ginsburgh began with individual 
regressions for each country in an attempt to find a common set of technical automobile 
characteristics that was important to consumers in every country under study.  Mertens 
and Ginsburgh used ANCOVA to test for equal slopes (parallelism) across countries, 
and found that they could not reject the hypothesis of parallelism.  Mertens and 
Ginsburgh chose to keep all of the original variables that were included, based on 
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regression results.  However, if they hadn't decided to keep all the variables that theory 
suggested, then they could have potentially thrown out a variable that was important to 
most countries, but not all.  Thus resulting in a specification error for most countries, and 
less accurate results of marginal effects.  Perhaps it is more prudent to let theory and 
industry expertise guide the choice of included variables, and use an empirical 
specification that will pick up differences in slopes across cross-sections.  Some 
interaction terms may be found insignificant, which can also be valuable information.  In 
fact, it is the potential differences in slope across the cross sections that is of the very 
essence in solving the problem at hand.
Bresnahan (1987) applied hedonic methods to the used U.S. automobile industry. 
In 1992, Purohit used hedonic pricing to model the relationship between new and used 
automobile markets.  These works furthered, the original work of Griliches (1961) for 
the use of hedonic models in the used vehicle markets.
In 1989, Palmquist expanded on the work of Witte et al and used both bid and 
offer functions in a hedonic setting.  His purpose was to develop a model of the derived 
demand for differentiated factors of production, specifically agricultural land.  He 
recognized that while it was common to treat land as a homogeneous factor of 
production, each parcel of land actually has a bundle of important characteristics that 
varies between tracts.  The price for which the land rents to an agricultural producer 
depends on the land's characteristics.  The price that a farmer is willing to pay to rent any 
particular piece of land is a function of the expected profits to the farmer, which the 
land's characteristics partially determine.  Palmquist's work is one of few examples, in 
which hedonic analysis is applied to a productive input market.  Like Palmquist's work, 
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the current project is dealing with a heterogeneous factor of production, and, like 
Palmquist, it is expected that price is a function of expected profit, which is partially 
determined by the input's characteristics.
Berry (1994) continued the use of hedonic pricing models to estimate supply and 
demand for differentiated products in imperfect markets.  He extended the use of 
hedonic pricing to discrete-choice models, both logit and probit.  His application 
illustrated the potential flexibility of hedonic pricing theory.  In 1999, Berry et al 
extended the previous work by applying hedonic, discrete-choice modeling to evaluating 
trade policy in the automobile industry.
Nerlove (1995) diverged from the previous hedonic literature.  He did not regress 
price, as the dependent variable, on a vector of quality attributes, as was standard in 
previous work.  Instead, he treated quantity sold as the dependent variable and regressed 
on price and quality attributes.  He justified the reduced form by assuming that prices 
and attribute contents could be taken as exogenous to the market under study, the 
Swedish wine consumer.  His estimates of shadow prices are shown to differ greatly 
from those obtained from using the more standard method of treating price of the market 
good as the dependent variable.  Nerlove pointed out that the general issue with 
standard, price-dependent, hedonic models is that they have an inherent “identification” 
problem.  Just as in the case of ordinary (not hedonic) demand analysis, using data on 
prices and quantities creates this issue.
However, Nerlove reminds us that if supply is exogenously determined, then the 
identification problem may be avoided in hedonic settings, just as it can be in non-
hedonic settings, under the same assumption.  According to Nerlove, both Shultz (1938), 
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and Court and Griliches (1961), show that if the quantity supplied shifts exogenously, 
independently of the shifts in the demand function, a regression of price on quantity will 
estimate the price elasticity of demand.  Nerlove relies on this idea, because he assumes 
that the different varieties of wine in the Swedish market are determined by world 
supply and demand considerations and are therefore exogenous to the Swedish 
consumers of wine, because Swedish consumers constitute such a small part of the 
overall world market.
In 1999, Goldberg and Verboven studied price differences in the European car 
market.  They attempted to explain the large and persistent differences in like car pricing 
between different countries.    Their model accounted for policy differences, namely 
import quotas, changes in price over time, and specific product attributes.  The model 
used different countries for cross-sectioning.  Using a semi-log, hedonic equation, with 
intercept shifters for cross-sectioning and other mutually exclusive, categorical variables, 
they were able to account for pricing differences not associated with physical product 
characteristics.  This work is another example of the precedent for using hedonic models 
to identify price differences in durable goods markets.
Hedonic Price Analysis In Input Markets
As has been pointed out in the previous section, the use of hedonic analysis has 
been primarily used in consumer goods markets.  More recent work in the Agricultural 
Economics literature includes two papers in which hedonic price equations are applied to 
production input markets.  The Review of Literature ends with a treatment of those two 
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works, as the current endeavor is also concerned, not with consumer products, but with 
applying the hedonic technique to income producing inputs.
Rudstrom (2004) estimates the implicit values of quality and packaging 
characteristics associated with dairy quality (high quality) hay.  Specifically, she 
assesses the importance of nutritional quality, bale size, and bale type in determining the 
market price of dairy quality hay.  She recognizes that the price paid for a production 
input, such as hay, should be a function of its characteristics, which impact the yield of 
final outputs.  She applies a hedonic pricing model, which allows for estimation of the 
implicit prices of these output yielding characteristics.
Rudstrom clearly and eloquently provides a theoretical backdrop, which justifies 
the use of the hedonic method in input markets.  Her backdrop is derived using basic 
producer theory, specifically, derived input demand.  She then applies continuous 
variables such as crude protein and relative feed value, which directly impact the 
quantity of milk produced by dairy cows, to her hedonic model.  She includes indicator 
variables for various bale types and sizes.  Rudstrom also includes indicator variables for 
the hay cutting, i.e. first-cutting of the season versus second, third, or fourth-cutting of 
the season.  The use of these indicators could have had potentially undesirable results in 
the Rudstrom work.
Nutrient qualities in hay, such as crude protein and relative feed value, are 
typically found to be a function of the cutting.  Hence, perhaps there is a significant 
correlation between the cutting indicator variables and the other explanatory variables in 
the model.  Rudstrom makes no mention of testing for collinearity.  If, in fact, degrading 
collinearity was present in her model, then estimated variances would have been high, 
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and her parameter estimates and hypothesis tests may be somewhat unreliable.  In the 
current work, great care will be taken to test for collinearity among independent 
variables.
The collinearity issue aside, Rudstrom's work presents a logical and theoretically 
sound approach to using hedonic analysis in input markets.  Rudstrom's theoretical 
backdrop is used here as justification for using a hedonic model.  Additionally, 
Rudstrom's organization and presentation of results, specifically her use of marginal 
values and price flexibilities, appear intuitive and relevant to the problem at hand, thus 
will be followed when appropriate.
Vanek et al (2008) use a hedonic model to estimate the implicit value of heritable 
traits (Expected Progeny Differences, EPDs) on sale prices of beef bulls (sires).  They 
attempt to find whether commercial beef cattle producers, who ultimately purchase the 
bulls as a productive input, pay a premium for superior genetics, which should produce a 
higher quality consumer product, beef.
The data used in their research included sales prices of bulls over a two-year 
period, from four large producers.  Their data represented an unbalanced cross-section, 
since each ranch had a differing number of observations.  They could have estimated 
four separate equations, one for each ranch.  However, they proceeded by stacking the 
data, arranging it as a block matrix, which was estimated using a single equation.
The current research uses unbalanced, cross-sectional data, observed for each of 
five years.  The number of observations in each cross-section are not equal, nor are the 
number of observations per year.  Because the data will be unbalanced, using a 
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covariance model is likely most appropriate.  In the covariance model, each cross-
sectional unit and each time period are characterized by intercept shifters.
Summary of Literature Review
Previous literature demonstrates the importance of accounting for differences in 
product characteristics, when attempting to identify any other determinants of 
differences in price.  The hedonic technique is widely used to account for observable 
differences in product attributes and/or quality.   Identifying meaningful customer 
segments is crucial in identifying potential reasons for price differences.  It is common in 
the hedonic literature to use indicator variables to account for cross-sectional data and 
qualitative characteristic variables.  The importance of testing for interaction, and using 
interaction terms when appropriate, has been established.  Both the market power 
literature and the hedonic analysis literature have a strong precedent for applying 
theoretical models to durable goods markets, and the vehicle market is certainly no 
exception.  Hedonic analysis has been applied successfully to intermediate (input) 
markets.
In the next chapter, the theoretical framework offered by Rudstrom (2004), 
which flows directly from Rosen (1974), and applies Rosen's hedonic theory to input 
markets, is augmented by incorporating the work of Anderson and De Palma (1988), to 
include relevant interaction terms between cross-sections and product attribute variables. 
In the spirit of Lancaster (1966) and Vanek et al (2008), a covariance model is used to 
simultaneously account for differences over time and between cross-sections, while 
estimating shadow prices of relevant product characteristics.  Expanding on Pigou 
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(1932) and Machlup (1955), customer segments are based on meaningful differences in 
product characteristics, which match the specific uses demanded by each segment.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Theoretical Model
As the previous chapter suggests, most studies employing hedonic pricing 
models have examined markets for final, consumer goods.  However, the current market 
under study is for an intermediate good, or input into a production/service process. 
Bucket trucks are an input that have value in the production and maintenance of utility 
infrastructure, i.e. power and communication lines.  The value of a bucket truck in the 
productive process lies in its physical characteristics.  Rudstrom (2004) used hedonic 
analysis to study the dairy (milk production) input market.  The theoretical backdrop 
offered here, begins by following Rudstrom's (2004) work, which is based on the 
seminal work of Rosen (1974).
Rather than specifying production as a function of finished inputs, production is 
expressed as a function of the characteristics of those inputs.  Let x j be the input 
characteristic, j , used in production.  Production of output, q , can be represented 
as
(1) q=F x1, x2,. .... , xn .
In the bucket truck market, working height is an example of an input characteristic.  One 
mile of finished, electric utility transmission line infrastructure is an example of a unit of 
output. The amount of a characteristic is a function of the amount of an input, v i , and 
the amount of the characteristic contained in the input.  The amount of an input 
characteristic, j , is
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(2) x j=G v1, v2,. ... , v i , x j1 , x j2 , .... , x jn 
where v i is the amount of input i and x ji is the amount of characteristic j
contained in one unit of input i .  Assuming profit-maximizing behavior, the profit 
function becomes
(3) =pF x1, x2,. ... , xn−∑
i=1
n
r i v i
where p is output price and r i is the price of input i .  Derived demands for input 
characteristics are obtained by differentiating (3) with respect to v i , the amount of 
input i , resulting in
(4) ∂
∂ vi
= p∑
j
∂F
∂ x j
∂ x j
∂v i
− r i = 0
  The term, p
∂ F
∂ x j
is the marginal value, or implicit price, of the jth characteristic. 
The term,
∂ x j
∂ v i
, is the marginal yield of characteristic j provided from one unit of 
input i .  Equation (4) provides the basis for the hedonic pricing model for inputs, 
where the input price is a function of the input characteristics (Rudstrom 2004).
Unlike the input, hay, studied by Rudstrom (2004), bucket trucks are a durable 
good, which are not used up during a single productive process, hence there is a time 
element, or useful life, which must be considered in the profit function.  The theoretical 
backdrop given above is not completely adequate for the current market under study. 
Equation (3) is adequate for examining profit as a single snapshot in time for a utility 
construction producer, where the quantity of output produced, per unit of work time, is a 
function of the physical characteristics of the bucket truck.  However, at the time of 
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purchase, the bucket truck buyer also assigns value based on the expected useful life of 
the asset, or the number of work-time units expected from the asset over its useful life. 
Lastly, the bucket truck buyer also assigns value based on the expected resale and/or 
salvage value of the asset upon disposal.
First, the present use of the term, “useful life.” should be clarified.  In this 
context, useful life refers to the length of time that the purchaser expects the vehicle to 
remain in his/her fleet.  The term is not intended to suggest that the bucket truck has no 
potential further use to any other entity or individual.  Secondly, let us recognize that the 
useful life of a bucket truck is not predetermined at the time of purchase.  A bucket 
truck's useful life can be extended (shortened) by the amount of maintenance/repair that 
the owner is willing (unwilling) to provide to the asset, but this is not without cost 
(savings).  Bucket truck purchasers assign value based partially on the expected 
maintenance/repair costs of owning the asset, and having the asset in a condition such 
that it can be put to work.  In the consumer market, similar costs are referred to as the 
cost of ownership.  In the current setting it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to 
ongoing maintenance/repair costs as an additional cost of production.
Let us assume that two different bucket truck purchasers, each buy a bucket 
truck, and that the two bucket trucks will be used to produce the same output.  It is 
expected that the physical characteristics, i.e. working height or 4x4, which determine
q from equation (1), will be similar, if not exactly the same, such that
(5) F 1x1, x2,. .... , x n ≡ F 2x1, x2,. .... , xn ,
where F 1 and F 2 are the production processes of bucket truck owners 1 and 2 
respectively, and F is measured per unit of work time.
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However, while the physical characteristics that determine F (output per unit 
of work time) are the same, not all other physical characteristics of the two bucket trucks 
are the same.  Bucket truck buyer 1 purchases a used bucket truck that is three years old, 
while bucket truck buyer 2 purchases a bucket truck that is five years old.  All other 
physical characteristics are assumed to be the same.  Let us further assume that each 
purchaser expects their truck to remain in their respective fleet for five years.  Bucket 
truck purchaser 2 expects to, and will likely, pay less for the five year old bucket truck, 
than purchaser 1 will pay for the three year old bucket truck.  In this case, the price 
difference is not due to differences in output per unit of work time since they are 
assumed equivalent in equation (5).  The price difference is not due to differences in 
useful life, they are assumed equal.  The price difference is due to the expected 
difference in repair/maintenance cost during the five years that the trucks remain in the 
fleets, and differences in the expected resale/salvage value of the asset at the end of five 
years.  The assumptions made are suitable, as it is common for some fleet operators to 
always buy newer bucket trucks and retire them in the same number of years as a fleet 
operator who purchases relatively older bucket trucks (Fumasi 2012).  Certain 
purchasers pay more when they purchase the bucket truck, with the expectation that 
ongoing production costs associated with the bucket truck will be lower, and the bucket 
truck's resale/salvage value may be higher.
Based on the discussion above, it is recognized that the purchase price of a 
bucket truck is not only determined by a vector of physical characteristics, which 
determine output per unit of work time, but is also determined by a separate vector of 
physical characteristics that influence ongoing production costs and resale/salvage value. 
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In an attempt to more fully exploit the use of the hedonic technique, conform to theory, 
and accommodate the aspect of durability discussed above, the assumption is made that 
useful life is equal between all bucket trucks, but that the cost to maintain the asset for a 
given useful life is determined by a vector of physical characteristics, which are known 
at the time of purchase.  Resale/salvage value is affected by the same or similar vector of 
physical characteristics known at the time of purchase.  Ongoing costs are additional 
production costs, which change the cost of producing one unit of output.  Increases in 
resale/salvage value partially offset these costs.  Equation (3) is adjusted, and it becomes
(6) =pF x1, x2,. ... , xn−∑
i=1
n
r ixn1 , xn2 , .... , x zv i ,
where a second set of physical characteristics, xn1 to x z , has been introduced.  This 
second set of physical characteristics affects the cost per unit of input, and is 
independent of the x1 to xn vector.  Differentiating equation (6) with respect to v i
gives derived demands for input characteristics as
(7) ∂
∂ vi
= p∑
j
∂F
∂ x j
∂ x j
∂v i
− r i = 0
Equation (7) is identical to equation (4).  The general profit maximizing condition for 
derived demands for input characteristics remains the same.  Note that 
xn1 , x n2 , .... , x z does not depend on v i , because the number of bucket trucks 
used in a particular productive process, does not impact the per unit cost associated with 
these variables.  However, the profit maximizing condition is not independent of the
xn1 , x n2 , .... , x z vector of variables, a fact that is easier seen by rearranging 
equation (7), to get
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(8) ∂
∂ vi
= p∑
j
∂F
∂ x j
∂ x j
∂v i
= r i xn1 , xn2 ,.... , x z .
As r i changes with changes in xn1 , x n2 , .... , x z so must the Marginal Value 
Product (MVP) on the left-hand-side, so that the two sides remain equal, and thus meet 
the profit maximizing condition.  The p
∂ F
∂ x j
term still represents the implicit price of 
the jth characteristic, but the profit-maximizing value of the term, p ∂ F
∂ x j
*
, sought 
in empirical analysis, is also a function of xn1 , x n2 , .... , x z .  The values of this 
vector are not exogenous to the bucket truck buyer's decision making process.  He/she 
chooses the xn1 , x n2 , .... , x z values during the purchasing process, just as the 
x1, x2,. ... , xn values are also chosen.  The buyer makes a purchasing decision based 
on two sets of characteristics, one set affecting the product/service produced, and 
another affecting the per unit cost of that production.  Hence, both sets of decision 
variables must be present and simultaneously accounted for in the hedonic equation, if 
accurate shadow prices are to be estimated.
Empirical Model
The primary objective of this project is to determine whether differences in price, 
which are not due to differences in physical product characteristics, exist between 
customer segments in the used bucket truck market.  Hence, indicating whether or not 
differences in demand elasticity likely exist between segments.  The most plausible 
differences in demand characteristics are in two distinct markets for bucket trucks:  Non-
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insulated units used in the Telecommunications industry and insulated units used in the 
Electric Utility industry.
In the covariance model design used there are two distinct cross-sections, 
distinguishing the two primary markets into which bucket trucks are sold:
1.  Electric Utility (EU)
2.  Telecommunications (Telecom)
These two cross-sections are referred to as Industries 1 and 2 respectively.  The cross-
sectioning variable is denoted as I i , i=1 to 2 .  Using a covariance model in this way 
should result in increased precision for parameter estimates and increased power for tests 
of hypotheses (Ott and Longnecker 2001).
The value of a used bucket truck should increase when it is insulated, ceteris 
paribus.  Additionally, bucket trucks used in the Electric Utility industry, tend to have 
higher working heights on average, which should also increase sales price, ceteris 
paribus.  Hence, differences in price between these two markets are expected.  However, 
within each industry, other specification variables should have similar marginal impacts 
on product price, if the law of one price holds.  The same percentage change in price, 
given a one percent change in the level of each physical characteristic, is not expected to 
be equal.  However, the absolute magnitude of each characteristic's impact on price 
should be approximately equal, regardless of the industry, if the law of one price holds. 
For example, it is expected that a 10,000 mile difference in the mileage of a vehicle will 
have the same dollar impact on the price of the vehicle, regardless of the level of I , 
assuming the law of one price.
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Based on this idea, intercept differences between industries are expected. 
However, the absolute, marginal impacts of the specification variables on price, should 
not be significantly different between industries, so the slope coefficients for those 
characteristics should be the same between cross-sections.  Interaction terms between 
cross-sections and each variable coefficient will be used to estimate any differences in 
slope coefficients between industries.
Hedonic price functions estimate neither supply nor demand, they model reduced 
form effects of product attribute levels on price, which are a function of both supply and 
demand (Rosen 1974).  Hence, the value of bucket truck characteristics may vary over 
time, in response to the underlying supply and demand conditions.  In the covariance 
model, each cross-sectional unit and each time period are characterized by intercept 
shifters.  The general equation, is given by:
(9) P it=01 I 1t...i−1 I  i−1 t1 X it , 1...k X it ,k
               11 I 1t ,1 X it ,1...i−1 k I i−1 t , k X it ,k1Y i1...T−1Y i T−1it
where P it is the average price in Industry i during Year t . I it=1 for the ith
Industry, and I it=0 otherwise. X it , k is the value of the kth physical characteristic 
found in Industry i  in Year t . Y it=1 for the ith Year, Y it=0 otherwise. 
it is the random error in Price associated with Industry i  during Year t .  The
 , , , terms represent parameters to be estimated.  Note that one industry 
indicator variable and one year indicator variable are excluded to avoid perfect 
collinearity.  
In the context of this problem, the X it , k variables represent levels of physical 
product characteristics, which affect either the product/service produced by the bucket 
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truck purchaser, or the per unit cost of that production.  Note that the equation also 
includes interaction terms between the X it , k variables and the I it indicator variables 
that denote the industries.  The  parameters to be estimated for these interaction 
terms are of particular interest in this research.  If the null hypothesis,
H 0: 11=12= ...=ik=0 , is rejected, then there are apparent price differences 
between industries, which are not accounted for by differences in physical 
characteristics.
Summary of Methods
Based on production theory and specifically using derived input demands, a 
theoretical backdrop for using hedonic analysis for productive inputs in general has been 
established.  However, it is recognized that buyers of durable goods condition their 
purchasing decisions based on two, distinct, sets of specification variables, one set 
affecting the product/service produced, and another affecting the per unit cost of that 
production.  Both sets of variables are included so that more accurate estimates of 
implicit prices are discovered.
In an attempt to identify potential differences in price between industries, which 
cannot be explained by differences in product attributes, a covariance model is used, 
which includes interaction terms between relevant cross-sections and relevant 
specification variables in the model.  Cross-sections used indicate different industry 
buyers, for which differences in demand elasticity could exist, and therefore introduce 
potential opportunities for price differences.  The interaction terms measure whether 
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there are significant differences in estimated shadow prices for specification variables 
between those cross-sections.
The next chapter, DATA, describes the specific set of specification (attribute) 
variables chosen.  Practical justification is given for the reason the set of variables is 
expected to have the greatest influence on price. The a priori expected signs for variable 
coefficients are also indicated.  A discussion of the data source, and a complete set of 
descriptive statistics for the variables is given.  The next chapter ends by identifying and 
discussing the limitations of the data.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA
The purposes of this chapter are to describe the specific variables hypothesized to 
have a significant impact on price, and to explore the sample data, which will be applied 
to the empirical model.  Data used are based on those required to most accurately test the 
research hypothesis.  Reasons for the inclusion of specific variables are given, along 
with each variable's expected direction of influence on price; either a positive 
relationship or a negative relationship.  Any estimation challenges/nuances potentially 
created by the specific data sample are noted.  The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the data limitations.
Specification Variables
Specification variables in this project are subset into two groups; variables 
affecting the product/service produced, and another affecting the per unit cost of that 
production.  Variables in both subsets are based on professional observation of the 
bucket truck market.  Each variable listed is followed by a brief explanation of the 
variable, and a justification as to why/how it is expected to influence price.
Variables Affecting the Product/Service Produced
Working Height (feet) – Working height is a continuous variable, which denotes 
the maximum platform height plus five additional feet.  Platform height is measured 
from the ground to the bottom of the platform (bucket).  As services are performed 
further upstream in the electric utility grid (further from the end-user) greater working 
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heights are required.  For example, electric utility transmission towers and lines are 
positioned at greater heights than are electric utility lines in housing subdivisions. 
Upstream services require not only working at greater heights, but require working 
on/near higher voltage and amperage.  All of which increase the hazard and 
specialization of the work.  As the need for more working height increases, so does the 
revenue per unit of output.  Thus, increasing working height is expected to have a 
positive effect on bucket truck price.
Material Handling – A material handling bucket truck, commonly referred to as 
a material handler, possesses a material handling winch at the boom tip.  This winch is 
designed to lift tools, parts and materials up to the elevation they are needed.  It lifts 
items up to the crew-members who are positioned in the bucket.  In the absence of 
material handling capabilities, the crew must rely on additional equipment, which is 
capable of lifting the objects.  For example, the crew may need an additional truck, 
which is fitted with some type of crane or elevated winch.  Non-material handling bucket 
trucks are referred to as Personnel Units.  Material handling bucket trucks have the 
ability to perform a wider variety of specific tasks independently, thus increasing the 
potential revenue generated by the bucket truck.  Material handling capability is a 
categorical variable expected to positively effect price.  Note that the vast majority of 
utility bucket trucks, which have material handlers, are insulated.  In the current data set, 
zero non-insulated, material handling bucket trucks were observed.
Front Drive Axle – Front drive axle is a qualitative (categorical) variable that 
denotes whether a bucket truck's front axle is a drive (powered) axle.  A common 
example is 4-wheel drive, in which the front axle gets power directly from the 
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powertrain of the vehicle.  Bucket trucks with front drive axles are either 4-wheel drive 
(4x4), or 6-wheel drive (6x6).  A tandem axle truck (two rear, drive axles) with a front 
drive axle is 6-wheel drive.  Bucket trucks with front drive axles have increased ability 
to safely and efficiently travel and perform work in more diverse terrains.  Utility lines 
are not always located next to easily accessible roads, nor next to roads at all.  Fleets that 
possess bucket trucks with front drive axles are more capable of performing services in a 
wider range of terrain and weather conditions, thus increasing their potential revenue. 
Possessing a front drive axle is expected to have a positive effect on price.
Variables Affecting the Cost of Production
Mileage (miles) – Mileage is a continuous variable, which denotes the total miles 
that the vehicle has been driven prior to the time of purchase.  Bucket trucks are 
mechanical in nature.  Mechanical systems tend to break down or work less efficiently as 
they wear (break-in period aside).  Increased wear is associated with increased use. 
Higher mileage is associated with increased use.  Hence, higher mileage trucks are 
expected to require a higher level of maintenance and/or repair to keep them in operating 
condition, and to reach any particular useful life time period.  Bucket truck price is 
expected to decrease as mileage increases.  Furthermore, bucket trucks with extremely 
low mileage, are often considered “like new” to buyers, hence it is expected that price 
declines more rapidly over the lower range of mileage, as a truck moves out of the 
perceived, “like new” status.  Mileage should then have a more gradual, linear effect on 
price.
Age (years) – Age is an ordinal variable, which refers to the age of the bucket 
truck (in years) at the time of purchase.  Age is calculated as the difference between the 
57
year of sale and the model year of the truck.  While usage, represented by mileage, 
increases the potential wear of mechanical components, some components wear over 
time, with some independence from usage.  Batteries, seals, and gaskets are examples of 
components that can actually wear faster during periods of non-use.  Regardless of 
mileage, buyers tend to associate newer vehicles with higher quality and less need for 
maintenance and repair.  However, there is also another reason that buyers may pay 
more for newer vehicles.  Body styles and technology change over time.  A bucket truck 
with a newer body style can give the impression of higher quality, especially if one does 
not know the mileage.  This appearance of quality can be beneficial to the bucket truck 
fleet, as it may give crew-members and customers greater confidence in the  company 
and its services.  New and improved technology may offer such things as improved fuel 
efficiency or better traction control.
Age is expected to be weakly correlated with mileage, however the miles driven 
per year can vary greatly depending on the type of work that is done by a particular fleet. 
It is not uncommon to see newer bucket trucks with much higher mileage than relatively 
older ones.  Both the mileage and the age variables should have significant, independent 
effects on price.  Bucket truck price is expected to decrease, as the age at time of 
purchase increases.  Additionally, the effect of increasing age on price is expected to 
increase in absolute magnitude for higher values of age, thus the variables are expected 
to have an exponential relationship, and age will enter the estimating equation in both 
linear and quadratic form.
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Cross-Sectioning Characteristic
Insulated vs Non-Insulated – Insulated bucket trucks are designed to be used in 
the electric utility industry, or other support industries, which work near energized 
power infrastructure.  These bucket trucks offer a secondary insulation source for crew-
members, by being designed with non-conductive components.  When in good working 
condition and properly used in specific, intended environments, these non-conductive 
components isolate personnel from being electrically grounded.  Specialized tools and 
personal protective equipment, such as cover-ups, hot sticks, and rubber gloves, are the 
lineman's primary source of protection.  Non-insulated bucket trucks are not designed for 
electric utility work and are used in the telecommunications industry.  Electric utility 
work commands a higher price per unit of output than does the telecommunications 
industry, due to increased hazards and specialization.  Due partially to being insulated, 
bucket trucks sold into the Electric Utility industry are expected to have a higher average 
price than non-insulated units sold into the Telecommunications industry.
Data Sample
Sales data were collected from one of the large used bucket suppliers that exhibit 
the characteristics described in Chapter 1.  These characteristics are hypothesized to 
potentially create an environment in which the law of one price does not hold.  The data 
represent  used bucket truck sales of the firm in years 2008 – 2012.  Observations in 
each year are in no particular order, hence the data are considered annual.  The sample 
does not include specialized types of aerial devices such as cable placers, track carrier 
propelled devices, specialized high line units, or backyard aerial devices.  The sample 
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includes only highway-legal, vehicle mounted bucket trucks, which are not specifically 
intended for placing fiber optic cable, do not posses over 99 feet of working height, and 
are not considered new.
The data sample includes 974 individual sales transactions.  Each of the six 
variables/characteristics, discussed above was measured for all observations. 
Frequencies for qualitative variables, and  descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
are given in the following tables.
Table 1.  Frequency Totals & By Year (2008 – 2012).
Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Unit Sales 974 116 163 199 237 259
% of Total Unit Sales 100% 12% 17% 20% 24% 27%
Electric Utility Unit Sales 749 77 112 162 205 193
% of Annual Unit Sales 77% 66% 69% 81% 86% 75%
Telecom Unit Sales 225 39 51 37 32 66
% of Annual Unit Sales 23% 34% 31% 19% 14% 25%
Material Handler Unit Sales 291 33 42 65 101 50
% of Annual Unit Sales 30% 28% 26% 33% 43% 19%
Front Drive Axle Unit Sales 169 7 19 48 46 49
% of Annual Unit Sales 17% 6% 12% 24% 19% 19%
Table 1 shows that total sales of bucket trucks for the dealer have steadily 
increased each year.  The percentage of telecommunications (telecom) units sold 
noticeably declined in years 2010 and 2011, as the percentage of electric utility (EU) 
units peaked in those years.  In 2012, the percentage of telecom units sold nearly 
doubled over 2011, but EU sales still accounted for 75% of the total.  The percentage of 
total sales that were material handling units had a significant drop in 2012 versus 2011, 
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from 43% to 19%.  Units with front drive axles tend to represent approximately 20% of 
total sales, particularly in more recent years.
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Sales Price ($) - Totals & By Year (2008 – 2012).
Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 45,345 32,539 40,245 44,230 51,161 49,825
StDev 18,159 17,454 19,530 16,149 17,464 15,712
95 % LCI1 44,039 28,859 36,785 41,645 48,603 47,624
95 % UCI2 46,651 36,219 43,706 46,816 53,720 52,026
CV 40.05 53.64 48.53 36.51 34.13 31.53
Min 9,250 9,250 11,000 10,500 14,400 14,400
Median 44,500 28,900 36,900 44,650 49,900 49,900
Max 125,000 125,000 120,000 85,000 109,000 119,900
Skewness 0.6501 1.7503 1.5195 0.2434 0.5580 0.5726
Kurtosis 0.9261 6.5186 3.0480 -0.4179 0.2620 1.3877
The means and medians given for sales price in table 2, above, appear relatively 
close for the total sample and in more recent years.  This suggests that a strong and 
consistent central tendency exists.  A strong central tendency is further indicated by the 
fact that the 95% lower confidence interval (LCI) and 95% upper confidence interval 
(UCI) bound a very small price range, relative to the  absolute minimum and maximum 
prices each year.  Comparing the absolute minimums and maximums with the 
confidence intervals suggests that significant outlying data points may be present at both 
the upper and lower ends of the price range.  The coefficient of variation (CV) has 
declined in more recent years, suggesting that variability in sales price, relative to the 
mean, has been decreasing.  Sales price tends to be skewed right, and has less kurtosis 
than a normal distribution.
1 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
2 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Working Height (ft) - Totals & By Year (2008 – 2012).
Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 47.7 46.2 47.7 47.7 49.8 46.6
StDev 11.9 12.8 13.4 10.4 13.1 9.8
95 % LCI3 46.9 43.5 45.4 46.0 47.9 45.2
95 % UCI4 48.6 48.9 50.1 49.4 51.7 48.0
CV 24.83 27.75 28.05 21.87 26.40 21.07
Min 32 33 32 33 33 33
Median 42 42 42 42 42 42
Max 98 98 98 95 98 98
Skewness 1.4066 1.4687 1.3541 0.8448 1.4459 1.5385
Kurtosis 2.7042 2.9891 1.8017 0.7372 2.7068 3.3068
Table 3 suggests that working height is right-skewed, but overall has kurtosis 
similar to a normal distribution.  Relative to the magnitude of the data values, the mean 
and median are not closely aligned.  The minimum, maximum , and median values are 
essentially identical in every year.  The data are heavily concentrated between 45 and 50 
feet, with an absolute range spanning 32 to 98 feet.  A long, right-hand tail exists. 
Variation, relative to the mean, reached its lowest point in 2012.
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for Mileage (mi) - Totals & By Year (2008 – 2012).
Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 85,902 103,296 87,756 88,560 81,254 79,156
StDev 43,819 46,039 45,985 45,461 42,222 39,279
95 % LCI5 82,750 93,589 79,607 81,282 75,067 73,653
95 % UCI6 89,054 113,003 95,904 95,839 87,440 84,658
CV 51.01 44.57 52.40 51.33 51.96 49.62
Min 434 18,341 11,088 1,106 7,892 434
Median 79,035 92,327 84,880 81,437 75,748 73,092
Max 305,998 252,096 268,636 305,998 231,770 204,674
Skewness 0.7836 0.6938 0.6157 1.0025 0.5968 0.8594
Kurtosis 0.9067 0.1732 0.3926 2.7615 -0.0328 0.4813
3 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
4 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
5 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
6 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for mileage.  Average mileage of units sold 
has consistently decreased over time.  Variation in mileage, relative to the mean, has 
been relatively consistent.  The measurements of skewness and kurtosis suggest that the 
data do not have a distribution with a distinct peak near the mean value, and that it is 
right-skewed.  Mileage spans a relatively high range of data, with a minimum of 434 
miles and a maximum of nearly 306K miles.
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics for Age (years) - Totals & By Year (2008 – 2012).
Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 7.1 8.4 7.3 6.6 6.9 6.9
StDev 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.7
95 % LCI7 6.9 7.9 6.8 6.1 6.5 6.5
95 % UCI8 7.3 8.9 7.7 7.0 7.3 7.3
CV 38.98 28.38 35.49 42.04 42.02 39.34
Min 1 3 2 2 1 3
Median 7 9 8 6 6 7
Max 20 15 14 20 18 16
Skewness 0.7429 0.1901 0.0334 1.0691 1.1184 0.9289
Kurtosis 0.4671 0.0118 -0.7771 1.7946 1.3123 0.4184
Table 5 suggests that the variation in age, relative to its mean, has increased in 
recent years.  However, the maximum value for age appears to have peaked in 2010, and 
has declined since.  The lowest average age occurred in 2010, but the annual average has 
a relatively small range of 6.6 to 8.4 years.  The descriptive statistics suggest that the 
data are not normally distributed, with a relatively flat peak (or lack thereof), and 
skewness to the right.
7 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
8 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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Table 6 is of particular interest in the present setting, as it presents descriptive 
statistics for sales price by industry.  As expected, the electric utility (insulated) category 
has a much higher mean sales price than the telecommunications (non-insulated) cross-
section.  Telecom units have a higher variation in price, relative to the mean, but EU 
equipment prices tend to have the most absolute variation.  Prices in both industries 
exhibit some skewness to the right, and have little kurtosis, relative to a normal 
distribution.  Both industries have a relatively large price range, but the EU industry has 
a particularly large difference between minimum and maximum price.
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for Sales Price ($) - By Industry (2008 – 2012).
Electric Utility Telecommunications
Mean 49,690 30,882
StDev 17,247 12,876
95 % LCI9 48,275 28,945
95 % UCI10 51,105 32,819
CV 34.71 41.69
Min 10,250 9,250
Median 48,900 29,900
Max 125,000 72,500
Skewness 0.7039 0.8793
Kurtosis 1.3440 0.8209
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics for working height by industry.  Telecom 
units have a very narrow range of working heights, and thus low variation relative to the 
mean, compared to the EU group.  Of potentially critical importance is the fact that 
average working height is very different between the cross-sections.  This suggests that 
there is a potentially high degree of correlation between working height and industry, 
which could lead to potentially degrading collinearity in the analysis.  However, it is 
9 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
10 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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expected that there is enough variation in price and working height, within each industry, 
such that little collinearity will be present when all variables are simultaneously 
accounted for during estimation.
Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for Working Height (ft) - By Industry (2008 – 2012).
Electric Utility Telecommunications
Mean 51 37
StDev 12 3
95 % LCI11 50 37
95 % UCI12 52 37
CV 22.76 8.33
Min 34 32
Median 45 35
Max 98 43
Skewness 1.3927 0.2652
Kurtosis 2.7394 -1.5604
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for mileage by industry.  Mean mileage is 
approximately 20% lower for the EU group than it is for the telecom group.  Mileage 
within the EU industry appears to have much more variation, relative to the mean value. 
The difference in average mileage between groups suggest that mileage is correlated 
with industry.  Further statistical tests are required to confirm whether the correlation is 
statistically significant, and whether the relationship causes degrading collinearity.
Table 9 shows that the average age at the time of sale is higher for the telecom 
industry, but the average ages differ by less than a year.  Like the other variables in this 
analysis, age at time of sale does not appear to come from a normal distribution.  Slight 
skewness and a lack of kurtosis, appear to be very common in the sample.
11 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
12 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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Table 8.  Descriptive Statistics for Mileage (mi) - By Industry (2008 – 2012).
Electric Utility Telecommunications
Mean 81,345 101,070
StDev 42,828 43,761
95 % LCI13 77,831 94,486
95 % UCI14 84,860 107,653
CV 52.65 43.30
Min 434 1,138
Median 73,677 99,901
Max 305,998 254,901
Skewness 0.9505 0.3673
Kurtosis 1.4443 0.29
Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics for Age (years) - By Industry (2008 – 2012).
Electric Utility Telecommunications
Mean 6.9 7.7
StDev 2.8 2.6
95 % LCI15 6.7 7.3
95 % UCI16 7.1 8.1
CV 40.31 33.82
Min 1 2
Median 6 8
Max 18 20
Skewness 0.8281 0.5745
Kurtosis 0.3229 1.6305
Table 10.  Material Handler & Front Drive Axle Frequency - By Industry (2008 – 2012).
Electric Utility Telecommunications
Unit Sales Per Industry 749 225
Material Handler Count 291 0
% of Industry 39% 0%
Front Drive Axle Count 156 13
% of Industry 21% 6%
13 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
14 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
15 LCI is the 95% lower confidence interval.
16 UCI is the 95% upper confidence interval.
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Table 10 shows that all Material Handling units in the sample are insulated, 
which is common in the industry.  Non-insulated material handling units are manufac-
tured, but are rare compared to other configurations.  Trucks possessing front drive axles 
appear to be far more common in the EU industry versus telecom.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of table 6, Descriptive Statistics for Sales 
Price by Industry, and shows estimated Probability Density Functions (PDFs) for sales 
price for each industry.  The vertical lines on each graph represent, from left to right, the 
lower quantiles, the averages, and the upper quantiles respectively.  Figure 1 shows that 
the mean sales prices are considerably different between industries, but that there is 
significant overlap between PDFs.  This suggests that industry is not adequate to define 
different and distinct price surfaces.  A task that will be undertaken through the 
introduction of the other specification variables; working height, material handling 
capability, possessing a front drive axle, mileage, and age of the bucket truck at time of 
sale.
Figure 1.  PDF Approximations of Sales Price ($) by Industry.17
17  Vertical lines on each graph represent, from left to right, the lower quantiles, the averages, and the upper quantiles respectively.
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Limitations of the Data
One limitation of the sample, is that it does not include make (brand) of the 
equipment or chassis.  As is pointed out by Borenstein (1985), sorting customers based 
on brand preference can be a stronger sorting mechanism than differences between basic 
product characteristics.  While brand likely has some impact on price, it is doubtful that 
brand has a more significant impact than the specification and cross-sectioning variables 
that will be applied to the model.
The final limitation of the data is that the sample comes from only a single firm 
in the industry.  While it is true that the firm chosen appears to posses the characteristics 
necessary for the exercise of market power, it would be remiss to think that the data from 
a single firm can accurately describe the supply and demand characteristics of an entire 
industry.
Data Summary
The most plausible physical characteristics that may significantly affect bucket 
truck price have been identified as:  Insulated/non-insulated status, material handling 
capability, working height, possessing a front drive axle, mileage, and age at time of 
sale.  Actual transaction prices and measurements of these six variables for each 
transaction, were collected from one of the largest U.S. bucket truck suppliers in the 
secondary market for years 2008 through 2012.  The firm sampled appears to have a 
relatively high level of specialized industry expertise, training, and human capital. 
Additionally, the firm is of relatively significant scale, appears to offer a truly 
68
differentiated product, and to posses a high level of operational efficiency and marketing 
dominance.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Chapter 5 presents the econometric parameter estimation results for the empirical 
model proposed in Chapter 3.  Statistical tests for validation of the the model are carried 
out, and the parameter estimates are evaluated for applied accuracy.  Estimated 
parameters for interaction terms are used to test the research hypothesis proposed.
Notation
In the estimating equation(s), variables are denoted as follows:
P = Sales Price ($)
I 1 = Industry 1 (Electric Utility) Indicator
I 2 = Industry 2 (Telecommunications) Indicator
X 1 = Working Height (ft)
X 2 = Material Handling Capability Indicator
X 3 = Front Drive Axle Indicator
X 4 = Mileage (mi)
X 5 = Mileage
X 6 = Age (years)
X 7 = Age2  (years)
Y 1 = Year Sold 2008 Indicator
Y 2 = Year Sold 2009 Indicator
Y 3 = Year Sold 2010 Indicators
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Y 4 = Year Sold 2011 Indicator
Y 5 = Year Sold 2012 Indicator
Variables, X 5Mileage  and X 7 Age2 are considered based on the 
expected curvilinear relationships between sales price and these variables.  Units with 
extremely low mileage are considered “almost new” by buyers, and therefore typically 
sell at considerably higher prices.  Sales Price is expected to fall rapidly as mileage 
increases over the lower range, but then have a more gradual, negative impact on sales 
price over the rest of the mileage range.  Age is expected to negatively affect price at an 
increasing rate.
To test the research hypothesis, two, competing estimating equations are 
considered:
(10) P= 0 2 I 2∑
i=1
7
i X i∑
t=1
4
t Y t , and
(11) P= 0 2 I 2∑
i=1
7
i X i∑
i=1
i≠2
7
i X i I 2∑
t=1
4
t Y t .
Note that Industry 1 (electric utility) and Year 2012, indicator variables have been 
excluded to avoid perfect collinearity.  Thus, electric utility units, sold in 2012 will serve 
as the reference case.  Additionally, note the i≠2 notation above the summation sign 
for interaction terms.  Recall that only electric utility units, in the sample, possess 
material handlers.  Hence, an interaction term between the industry indicator and the 
material handling indicator would be nonsensical and it would create perfect collinearity. 
The I 2 X 2 interaction term was therefore left out of the equation.
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Results of Econometric Parameter Estimation
The full equation, Equation 11, was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS).  A White's test revealed significant heteroscedasticity.  The variance of the error 
term was significantly dependent on the values of numerous explanatory variables.  This 
form of heteroscedasticity is common in cross-sectional data.  As a more efficient 
estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity, weighted least squares (WLS) was then 
employed.  The absolute values of the OLS residuals were regressed on all non-discrete, 
explanatory variables in the model, producing i  .  Weights used for WLS estimation 
were w i=1/ i .  A White's test on the WLS residuals found no significant 
heteroscedasticity.
  The WLS results of the parameter estimation for Equation 11 are presented in 
table 11.  Equation 11 has an F-Statistic that is significant at the =.01 level, 
indicating that the group of explanatory variables is statistically significant in explaining 
variation in sales price.  All of the basic variables (non-interaction terms), except two, 
were significant at the =.05 level.  Most were significant at =.01 .
All of the basic variables were found to have the correct, a priori expected signs. 
Note that while X 4  (Mileage) had an estimated coefficient that was positive, and 
statistically insignificant, this was not necessarily unexpected.  X 5 (Square Root of 
Mileage) had an estimated coefficient with the correct, negative sign, and was found to 
be significant.  The effect of X 4 and X 5 combined, over the range of data, has the 
expected effect on P.  Price drops rapidly as mileage increases, when mileage is 
extremely low.
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Table 11.  WLS Parameter Estimation Results for Equation 11.
Variable
Estimated 
Parameter
Standard 
Error
Intercept 64,876.7600 *** 4,753.0760
Telecom Indicator (I2) -27,367.3300 *** 8,955.5930
Working Height (X1) 680.7763 *** 46.7846
Material Handling Indicator (X2) 7,847.2930 *** 567.5552
Front Drive Axle Indicator (X3) 510.1281 620.9701
Mileage (X4) 0.0031 0.0403
Square Root Mileage (X5) -60.8686 ** 23.8749
Age (X6) -5,728.9890 *** 609.7234
Age2 (X7) 128.0158 *** 41.0359
Telecom x Working Height (I2X1) 527.4875 *** 143.2520
Telecom x Front Drive Axle (I2X3) 1,876.1850 2,119.9560
Telecom x Mileage (I2X4) 0.1469 ** 0.0612
Telecom x Square Root Mileage (I2X5) -74.0054 * 39.3752
Telecom x Age (I2X6) 2,620.3120 *** 861.9180
Telecom x Age2 (I2X7) -70.1418 52.8018
Year Sold 2008 Indicator (Y1) -9,068.5020 *** 706.0095
Year Sold 2009 Indicator (Y2) -7,652.4910 *** 600.1018
Year Sold 2010 Indicator (Y3) -7,389.0410 *** 623.9398
Year Sold 2011 Indicator (Y4) -2,223.5090 *** 616.4140
 
Adjusted R-Squared 86.6585
Standard Error of Regression 6,411.9900
F-Statistic 352.1131 ***
 
Note:  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Three of the interaction term coefficients were found to be statistically significant 
at the =.05 level.  All three estimated coefficients had positive signs.  The 
estimation results suggest that the dealer can charge more for increased working height 
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within the telecom industry, all else being equal.  Furthermore, increased mileage and 
increased age, have less of a negative impact on price within the telecom industry. 
Apparently, the telecommunications buyers are willing to pay more for increased 
working height, and require less of a discount for more “negative” characteristics, ceteris 
paribus.  However, for the majority of physical characteristics, no differences were 
found between industries, in how their changes affected price.
Applied Accuracy of the Model
As discussed above, the signs on coefficients match theoretical and applied, real-
world, expectations.  Based on T-ratios, the F-Statistic, and the adjusted R2 for the 
equation, it represents a reasonable set of parameters for estimating bucket truck price. 
From an applied perspective, the sizes of the coefficients are also very reasonable.  The 
model is capable of estimating an adequately accurate, average price, given a vector of 
values for explanatory variables, which are within the range sampled.
The Year Sold indicator variables, Y 1 through Y 4 , accurately reflect what is 
known to be true about underlying supply and demand conditions in the industry.  Since 
2008, the market demand for bucket trucks, particularly in the Electric Utility industry, 
has continued to shift outward rapidly.  The shift is primarily due to rapid build-out and 
government funding for utility infrastructure across the United States and Canada.  At 
the same time, supply of high-quality, used equipment has tightened.  The inward shift in 
supply is primarily due to higher rental utilization rates, which has prompted, and in 
some cases forced, bucket truck rental firms to keep bucket trucks in their fleets for 
longer time periods.  Hence, making these “raw materials” unavailable to bucket truck 
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remanufacturers.  Also, a challenging macro-economic environment has prompted many 
larger utility fleets, who still purchase new units, to put off replacement.  Thus limiting 
the number of used units on the market.
Misspecification Analysis
Collinearity/Multicollinearity
Potential correlation between regressors was a concern briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 4.  The inclusion of the Mileage and Age2  terms necessarily creates 
collinearity between these and their non-transformed counter-parts.  Additionally, the 
inclusion of interaction terms systematically creates collinearity.  The collinearity 
created by these additional variables is unavoidable in the model estimated, however the 
extent to which the variance of the estimates was being inflated was identified.
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) greater than 2.5 were found for the Mileage,
Mileage ,  Age, and Age2  variables, which were expected.  All interaction terms 
except I 2 X 3 had high VIFs (greater than 65), which was also expected.  The Year 
indicators were not found to be linearly related to other explanatory variables.  
Coefficient variance decomposition was also carried out.  Condition numbers for 
every eigenvalue were extremely small.  For the form of decomposition used, extremely 
small condition values suggest further examination (unlike the typical 30, cut-off value). 
Examination of the variance decomposition proportions revealed that the most 
potentially problematic collinearity existed between the Industry indicator and X 3 , 
Front Drive Axle.  Recall from Chapter 4 that EU units were far more likely to have a 
front drive axle.  The degrading collinearity between these variables, is likely the reason 
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that X 3 is not shown to be statistically significant in table 11. X 1 (Working Height) 
was not found to have a degrading collinear relationship with the Industry indicator.
Influence Diagnostics
An analysis of the potential presence of influential observations was carried out 
next.  First, a scatter plot of WLS residuals, which is shown in figure 2, was examined. 
Figure 2 suggests at least three outlying data points with residuals greater than $30,000. 
To gain more guidance on how to proceed, a graph of studentized residuals, figure 3, 
was viewed.  Observation of figure 3 suggests that a relatively large number of 
observations produced residuals that were more than two standard deviations from the 
mean of zero.  However, besides seven observations with abnormally high, positive 
residuals, the residuals tended to fall uniformly within a consistent range between 
± $20,000.  Those seven observations were examined more closely.
Three of the seven, investigated observations appeared to produce extremely 
large residuals, because the sales price was atypically high, considering the age of the 
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units.  However, the observations had very high working heights, and two had relatively 
low mileage.  The other three observations had atypically high sales prices, considering 
the values of their specification variables in general.  Data was examined for human 
entry errors, none were found.  These observations, producing outlying errors, were 
indeed bona fide, accurate observations.
Viewing residuals does not necessarily identify leverage points, points with 
extremely high values for explanatory variables.  Nor does viewing residual plots 
quantify the potential influence of outlying data points.  Hence, formal influence 
diagnostic tables were produced, these included studentized residuals, diagonal elements 
of the hat matrix, DFFits, and DFBetas.  Using the hat matrix, three leverage points 
were identified.  These observations had exceptionally low values for mileage. 
However, the studentized residuals for these observations were well below 2; the 
observations were not found to be influential.
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Four additional observations were found to have high studentized residuals and 
either high DFFit, high DFBeta, or both.  These four observations were closely 
examined.  Observation 51 sold for $95,000, although it was ten years old and had 
95,000 miles.  However, it did have an 82 foot working height.  Observation 493 sold for 
$109,000, although it only had a working height of 42 feet.  However, it did possess a 
material handler, was only one year old, and had only 7,892 miles.  Observation 518 sold 
for $42,400, although it only had a working height of 34 feet, had 126,000 miles, and 
was nine years old.  Observation 633 sold for $45,000, although it had a working height 
of only 35 feet and was 15 years old.  It did have relatively low mileage of 49,000.
Observations 51 and 493 represent the importance of more working height and 
low age in determining price, respectively.  While these two observations potentially had 
a profound impact on estimated parameter values, they were not removed.  The influence 
of extreme working heights, above 70 feet, and extremely low age, one year old, should 
not be underestimated in determining price.  Observations 518 and 633 were more of a 
quandary.  These data points potentially had an undue influence on the fit of the model. 
For some reason the dealer was able to command a higher price than expected, relative 
to the ages, working heights, and mileage of the bucket trucks.  However, these types of 
observations speak to the very heart of the research hypothesis, which is that the law of 
one price does not hold for this industry.  It is expected that additional sales transaction 
samples taken in the future from this, or similar dealers, will likely contain these same 
types of outlying and influential observations.  These types of observations are accurate 
and instructive realities within this market.  None of the influential observations were 
removed from the analysis.
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Formal Testing of the Research Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Differences in price between customer segments are primarily due to differences 
in physical product characteristics, but these characteristics do not fully account for 
differences in price.
Formal N  ull Hypothesis  
H 0: 11=12= ...=ik=0
The  parameters represent the coefficients of the interaction terms in the 
model.  The estimated parameters were used to test 21=23=24=25=26=27=0 . 
An F-test was used to test this restriction, using the estimates from the WLS model. The 
test results indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected at the =.01 level.
Conclusion
The null hypothesis is rejected with 99% confidence, and it is concluded that the 
estimated shadow prices for bucket truck characteristics are not equal between the 
Electric Utility and Telecommunications industries.
 The bucket truck dealer can charge more for increased working height within the 
telecom industry, all else being equal.  Increased mileage and increased age, have less of 
a negative impact on price within the telecom industry.  Apparently, telecommunications 
buyers are willing to pay more for increased working height, and require less of a 
discount for more “negative” characteristics, ceteris paribus.
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Summary of Results
The econometric parameter estimation yielded results that conformed to 
theoretical and real-world expectations.  The original OLS estimation was found to have 
significant heteroscedasticity, resulting in lack of efficiency.  Subsequently, estimation 
was carried out using WLS, which resulted in homoscedastic residuals.  F-test results on 
a group of interaction terms, and t-test results on individual interaction terms, suggested 
that changes in certain physical characteristics had differing effects on bucket truck 
price, depending on the industry into which they are sold.  All statistically significant 
interaction terms were positive, indicating that bucket truck buyers in the 
telecommunications industry pay more than buyers in the electric utility industry, for 
marginal increases in working height, and pay more for bucket trucks that are marginally 
older and have marginally higher mileage, ceteris paribus.  The results suggest that the 
law of one price is not holding true in the used bucket truck market.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
Historically, secondary (used) durable goods markets have not possessed the 
characteristics necessary for product differentiation and/or market power to exist. 
Hence, the majority of secondary market research has focused only on how their 
existence affects market power in the primary market.  However, in recent years a 
secondary market has emerged that appears to possess the characteristics for which it is 
possible that market power may exist; product differentiation, high barriers to scale, 
relative ease of customer segmentation, and limited arbitrage possibilities.  Additionally, 
the market serves a critical need in providing the electric and communications utilities 
that people rely upon, because it provides specialized equipment, bucket trucks, to those 
companies who build and maintain utility infrastructure.  The market is that of a 
necessary productive input, for which suitable alternatives do not exist.
The hedonic technique was used to determine whether price differences between 
customer segments was evident in the secondary bucket truck market.   Five objectives 
were defined.  The first objective was to identify the most suitable theoretical framework 
for the problem at hand.  Second was to determine the appropriate empirical model for 
estimation.  The third objective was to determine the most appropriate statistical 
technique to estimate parameters.  Fourth was to validate the model both statistically and 
for applied accuracy.  The final objective was to conduct the appropriate statistical tests 
81
to reach a conclusion about the research hypothesis.  In what follows, the results of this 
study are summarized, and implications of these results are discussed.
Contributions of the Research
Past studies of primary – secondary market interaction have failed to incorporate 
the possibility that market power may exist in the secondary market, because the 
traditional structure of used, durable goods markets gave researchers little reason to do 
so.  The growth of the world-wide-web, coupled with other market-specific factors, has 
the potential to change the way secondary markets develop.  The results of this project 
suggest that the law of one price does not necessarily hold in the secondary bucket truck 
market.  The current project lends itself to future research in the areas of market power 
and primary – secondary market interaction, because market power in secondary markets 
is likely to have some effect on primary markets.  Conventional theorists may desire to 
take this potential effect into account, and adjust the assumptions used to relate 
secondary markets to primary ones.  Additionally, this project identifies the factors, 
which can potentially lead to market power in a secondary market, thus providing a 
usable backdrop to make identifying such phenomenon an easier task.
This study supplements the hedonic literature, with respect to valuing the 
characteristics of productive inputs, by incorporating the aspect of durability directly 
into the hedonic equation.  The buyers of older durables may well expect to get the same 
useful life from the asset, as those buyers who purchase relatively newer durables.  The 
difference, is in the relative cost of maintaining each asset over a fixed, and equal useful 
life.  These differences in expected costs are a function of certain physical 
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characteristics, which are known to the buyer at the time of purchase.  The purchase 
price of durable inputs is not only determined by a vector of physical characteristics, 
which determine output per unit of work time, but is also determined by physical 
characteristics that influence ongoing production costs and resale/salvage value.
The profit maximizing condition is not independent of these additional 
characteristics, and the values of this vector are not necessarily exogenous to the buyer's 
decision making process.  The buyer makes a purchasing decision based on two sets of 
characteristics, one set affecting the product/service produced, and another affecting the 
per unit cost of that production.  Hence, both sets of decision variables must be present 
and simultaneously accounted for in the hedonic equation, if accurate shadow prices are 
to be estimated.
Summary
Rosen's (1974) hedonic framework, which was used by Rudstrom (2004) to 
model productive inputs, was augmented to more fully exploit the use of the hedonic 
technique, conform to theory, and accommodate the aspect of durability in the bucket 
truck market.  Using this theoretical backdrop, implicit prices for bucket truck 
characteristics were empirically estimated, which accounted for physical characteristics 
affecting both marginal output and marginal input costs for bucket truck users.
In an attempt to detect differences in price for similar products between customer 
segments, a covariance model was used, which cross-sectioned purchasers into two 
distinct industries; electric utility and telecommunications.  Interaction terms between 
industry cross-sections and product attribute specification variables were included to 
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detect any differences between industries in how prices were affected by changes in 
product attribute levels.  Indicator variables for each time period were used to account 
for any underlying structural changes in supply and demand.
Five years of data were collected from one of the primary bucket truck suppliers 
in the United States.  The dealer appeared to possess all the characteristics necessary for 
the potential exercising of market power.  Data included actual transaction prices, as 
well as the observed levels of each physical characteristic deemed most important in 
determining price.  Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was attempted, but 
considerable heteroscedasticity prompted the use of weighted least squares (WLS), 
which removed the effect of the heteroscedasticity, and was found to be a more efficient 
estimator.  The signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients were found to 
conform to theoretical and real-world expectations.  Variables such as working height, 
material handling capability, age, and mileage were found to have a significant impact 
on bucket truck prices.  Estimated coefficients for the annual time-series indicators were 
found to have a large and highly significant impact on bucket truck prices.  These 
estimated effects from changes in underlying supply and demand conditions, conformed 
to what has appeared to be the case in the bucket truck market.
Estimated coefficients for the interaction terms between industry and physical 
characteristics, allowed the testing of the research hypothesis:
Differences in price between customer segments are primarily due to differences  
in physical product characteristics, but these characteristics do not fully account for  
differences in price.
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Based on the statistical tests and the assumptions made in this project, the 
hypothesis should not be rejected.  Results indicate that some bucket truck dealers may 
have the ability to charge higher prices to the telecommunications industry.  Specifically, 
marginal changes in working height appear to more greatly raise price in this industry, 
and increasing mileage and age, do not have as severe negative impacts on price.
Implications of the Study
 One potential implication of the study lies in the results of the hypothesis test.  If 
the law of one price, does indeed not hold in this market, then it may be an indication 
that market power exists to some extent.  The used bucket truck market appears to be 
oligopolistic.  However, in most oligopolistic settings, prices are driven lower by fierce 
price or quantity competition, such that all prices are equal at marginal cost.  Since this 
study does not compare prices between multiple dealers, it is possible that used bucket 
truck prices, in general, tend to possess the same differences in implicit prices between 
industries.  If this is the case, then perhaps there is some level of information asymmetry. 
Not necessarily asymmetry between the information that exists for dealers versus 
customers, but asymmetry in the information that exists between electric utility buyers 
versus telecommunications buyers.
The second implication relies, not so much on the results of the study, but in the 
seemingly unique set of characteristics that the general bucket truck market appears to 
possess.  It is a durable goods market, in which no comprehensive dealer network exists 
for the OEMs.  There appears to be relatively high barriers to entry/scale, due to the fact 
that high levels of specific, technical skills are necessary, which are not common, due to 
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the uniqueness of the product and market.  The product is a necessity in certain 
industries, such that not buying at all, is often not a viable business choice.  The 
secondary segment of the market may actually exhibit lower overall “search costs” for 
end-users than the primary market, due to production times.  There is a high level of 
quality variation in product sold in the secondary market.  A high level of product 
differentiation likely exists, because of high degrees of marketing dominance.  The aerial 
device OEMs cannot fully exploit the idea of a profit maximizing obsolescence path, 
because they can only control the quality of the aerial device, not the truck chassis. 
Further, due to safety specifications, OEMs are forced to build aerial devices such that 
they will far outlast the useful life of the truck chassis.
When combined, the market characteristics described above, create a potentially 
important implication for aerial device OEMs and secondary market suppliers.  It may 
be possible, that a properly organized, secondary market dealer/remanufacturer, can 
ultimately compete directly with the OEMs for market share in the “primary” market.  If 
a secondary market dealer possesses the technical ability, scale, efficiency, and 
marketing dominance necessary to produce and promote a “like new” product, then it 
gives traditional, new bucket truck buyers, a potential alternative to the OEMs, without 
ever having to produce its own aerial devices.  A properly remanufactured aerial device, 
mounted onto a new truck chassis, becomes a viable alternative to new.
Recommendations for Continuing Research
Four recommendations for future research should be considered.  First, the model 
proposed here should be expanded to account for brand (make) of at least the mounted 
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equipment, and perhaps the make of the chassis.  Secondly, if similar sales data could be 
collected from at least one, additional dealer, then a comparison of prices between 
dealers could be conducted, while controlling for differences in physical product 
characteristics.
The third recommendation is that separate equations be estimated for the electric 
utility and telecommunications industries.  If it is assumed that the error terms are 
correlated across equations, then seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) may be a 
suitable technique.  Statistical tests could then be conducted to determine whether 
specification variable coefficients are equal across the two equations.  No interaction 
terms would be necessary in the model.
Lastly, the proposed, or similar, model should be applied to other used durable, 
secondary markets, which may be economically critical.  The secondary tractor market 
may be a suitable candidate.  Like bucket trucks, the used tractor market likely has more 
barriers to entry than the used car market, which makes it more likely for market power 
to emerge.  Tractors are a productive input, so the methods used here could be directly 
applied.
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